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Page 6 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: Court is now in session. I'm going to 3 go ahead and note this is a continuation of the hearing that 4 began yesterday in case number 23-10385 TV Azteca, S.A.B. de 5 C.V. And for purposes of the record, I'm going to ask the attorneys again to put their appearances on the record. I'm 7 going to remind the attorneys they have to speak at the 8 podium to do that. Thank you. 9 MR. CLAREMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Billy Clareman from Paul Weiss on behalf of the alleged Debtors. 10 11 I'm again joined at counsel table by Kelley Cornish and Jay 12 Cohen. 13 MS. CORNISH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 15 MR. COHEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 16 MR. QURESHI: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Abid 17 Qureshi, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer and Feld, and with me are Michael Stamer, Sarah, Schultz, and David Giller all on 18 19 behalf of the petitioning Creditors and the indentured 20 Trustee. 21 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 22 MAN 1: Good afternoon. Thank you. 23 MR. PLAZA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Curtis Plaza from Riker Danzig on behalf of Bank of New York as 24 25 indentured trustee.

Page 7 1 THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Plaza. 2 MR. PLAZA: Thank you. 3 MS. BOY SKIPSEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 4 Katherine Anne Boy Skipsey from Sheppard Mullin on behalf of 5 Diamond Films. 6 THE COURT: Good afternoon. All right. Okay. 7 we are here for closing argument, and I presume -- I don't know who on your side is going to handle it, Mr. Clareman, 8 9 whether it's you or one of your partners. 10 MR. CLAREMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I will be 11 splitting --12 THE COURT: Uh-huh. That's fine. 13 MR. CLAREMAN: -- closing with Kelley Cornish. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. CLAREMAN: Your Honor, I have a closing dec 16 that I'd like to hand up if I may approach. 17 THE COURT: Yes. You may approach. Thank you. 18 MR. CLAREMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. If you turn to page -- the first page of the dec that we handed up, that 19 20 sets forth a summary of the arguments that we have advanced 21 to dismiss these involuntary cases. There are four 22 arguments that we've made. The first is that dismissal is 23 warranted under Section 305(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Second, that dismissal on the basis of form non-convenience 24 25 Third, that dismissal for lack of standing is appropriate.

under Section 303(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code is appropriate. And fourth, that dismissal under Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is appropriate on the facts of this case. I will be addressing arguments under 305(a)(1), and form non-convenience, and Ms. Cornish will be addressing the arguments under Section 303(b)(1) and 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.

THE COURT: That's fine, Mr. Clareman. I guess I should just warn you the way that I usually will probably do this is not interrupt you, probably not interrupt you either, but I will have questions afterwards. So the two of you will have to figure out who's going to answer my various questions afterwards. Just warning you.

MR. CLAREMAN: No problem, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CLAREMAN: Okay. I'd like to start if you'd turn to Page 3. I'd like to start with the hearing and the evidence that came in yesterday. At the end of the day, the experts agree on at least the following point. All of the alleged Debtors have an establishment in Mexico under Article 279(6) of the LCM. They also agree that Article 293 of the Bankruptcy Code requires a concurso to be initiated for all of the alleged Debtors to recognize any foreign proceeding that would arise from this case.

They also agree that if this Chapter 11 proceeding

were recognized in Mexico as a foreign non-main proceeding, a full concurso would be required. And they also agree on what that means. That means the visita stage under the concurso law must be commenced, the conciliation stage must be observed. No reorganization's possible over the objection or without the approval of the Debtors. The IFT, which regulates TV Azteca and provides it with concessions to broadcast television has specific enumerated rights, which include the right to veto any plan of reorganization, to supervise the conciliator, among other things.

And the reorganization must otherwise comply with all of the applicable provisions of the LCM, Mexican law, and public policy. The outcome of that agreement in this case is that there will inevitably be here a do-over in Mexico arising from these proceedings.

I'll turn next starting with the next page to address the disagreement that exists with respect to the application of Article 293 to these cases. There's really only one narrow area of disagreement as it relates to Article 293. And we submit that Profession Mejan, his testimony on this subject is the testimony that should be credited.

Professor Mejan explained that a full concurso is required any time recognition is sought for a Debtor with an establishment in Mexico. Professor Mejan -- and that exists

whether it's main or non-main. Establishment is the key term under Article 293. Professor Mejan provided that opinion in his opening declaration. He remained consistent in his subsequent declarations. He was consistent in this trial on that subject. His opinion is based on the text of Article 293, which does not differentiate between main and non-main proceedings. Article 293 and 294 draw a distinction between establishment in Mexico concurso, no establishment in Mexico ancillary.

There are other provisions in the LCM including Article 309, for example, that do draw a distinction between main and non-main proceedings. The LCM says in its text when there is a difference required by -- for recognition of foreign main and foreign non-main proceedings, and that is not contained in Article 293.

In contrast to Mr. Mejan's -- Professor Mejan's opinions, Mr. Guerra has been inconsistent in these proceedings with respect to his interpretation of Article 293. We have seen his opinion evolve over the course of declarations and testimony. In Mr. Guerra's initial declaration, he testified that -- and I'm quoting from JX 123 at Paragraph 32, "Starting the concurso from scratch solely because a Debtor's center of main interest is in Mexico is inconsistent with the purpose of Title 12."

That's where Mr. Guerra started.

He did not, in his initial declaration, explain

Article 293, how it worked. That was missing, and he

disagreed with the -- or he was purporting to disagree at

that time with Professor Mejan's opinions. In Mr. Guerra's

supplemental declaration, after seeing Mr. -- Professor

Mejan's two initial declarations, Mr. Guerra stated

Professor Mejan is correct that Article 293 provides that a

full concurso needs to be initiated for recognizing any

foreign proceeding of a company that has an establishment in

Mexico.

I'm quoting from JX 130 at Paragraph 47. Mr. Guerra's supplemental declaration did not describe a differentiation between foreign main and foreign non-main proceedings in talking about Article 293 and how it applied. But at trial, Mr. Guerra testified that a full concurso is only required if a Chapter 11 case is recognized as a foreign non-main proceeding if it's -- if recognition is sought and the Chapter 11 cases for a foreign main proceeding. Then Mr. Guerra testified you don't need to do the full concurso. You can stop short after the visitation stage.

This interpretation has no support whatsoever in Article 293, other provisions of the concurso law, and Mr.

Guerra confirmed there were no cases that he was aware of to support his interpretation. But as a result of that

reading, that tortured reading of Article 293, Mr. Guerra now has to cling to the opinion that the alleged Debtors

COMI is in the United States. And we submit that that is not a remotely credible opinion. It -- his opinion that a Mexican court would more likely than not -- that was his testimony, conclude that the alleged Debtors have their COMI in the United States is not only incredible, but that opinion should be weighed by the Court in assessing any of Mr. Guerra's opinions.

His claim is essentially that because 3 of the 35 alleged Debtors are incorporated or organized under U.S., that's sufficient to establish that all of the alleged Debtors' COMI is in the United States. Mr. Guerra ignores the fact that 25 of the 25 alleged Debtors that are domiciled in Mexico, 7 more are domiciled in other countries outside the U.S., and that substantially all of the alleged Debtors' operations, management, employees, offices, and revenues are located in or derived from Mexico.

His opinion appears to be intertwined -- we heard some of this in his testimony yesterday that his opinion on COMI perhaps is intertwined with his what I'll call confusion about the relationship between COMI and jurisdiction, that there's no basis for that conclusion or drawing that link. It isn't, and nothing in Articles 15, 15 biz, or 17 of the LCM are to the contrary or support his

opinions. None of his opinions about Article 293 has any support in any body of law that he could point to.

I'll turn next to Slide 7. Based on the evidence, at most, at most, these proceedings could be recognized potentially as a foreign non-main proceeding. That is I think the most that the evidence could ever show for some of the alleged Debtors. I'm going to come back to establishment. I'm not conceding that point, but I -- just to frame the consequence of what I think is the clear conclusion based on the evidence is that if these cases were recognized as a foreign non-main proceeding, there would need to be a full concurso. That is the evidence, and that is the most that I think Mr. Guerra has agreed to. But I think it is dispositive ultimately here.

So what that means is that upon any request for recognition, the visitation stage would start, take 15 to 30 days. If the insolvency test is met, a conciliator would be appointed, and the conciliation phase would be initiated. That would take up to a year. Any plan of reorganization has to comply with all of the provisions of the LCM. No plan can be approved by the concurso court without the Debtors' agreement and the requisite amount of Creditor support.

Any change to the Debtors' equity requires the consent of TV Azteca shareholders. Any plan has to be

approved by the IFT, which will have substantial rights to appoint and supervise the conciliation stage. If the conciliation stage is unsuccessful, there would be a liquidation in Mexico, okay? That is inevitable, and I think that the evidence shows that at this point and cannot be refuted.

A Chapter 11 case -- if Your Honor would turn to the next slide, a Chapter 11 case under these circumstances that can only be a prelude to a full concurso will not accomplish a reorganization of the alleged Debtors. It will impose substantial cost. It will impose substantial disruption to their business. The factors courts consider, I will back to these factors in a bit, but the factors that courts have described as relevant to the analysis as to whether to dismiss the Chapter 11 case under Section 305(a)(1), all of them point to dismissal under the circumstances we submit.

Economy and efficiency of an administration of a reorganization cannot be advanced or achieved by a Chapter 11 case. Chapter 11 proceedings will not produce an enforceable plan of reorganization or distribution of the Debtors' assets. A second insolvency proceeding would be necessary, would be required in this case rendering this proceeding ultimately superfluous. A Chapter 11 case that is preliminary to a concurso case would be time-consuming.

It would be expensive. Ultimately, it would harm the Debtors. It would harm their stakeholders. It would harm their Creditors.

If you would turn to the next slide, the features of Mexican law that we have described and that Professor Mejan described, that's the reason why Mexican companies that seek reorganization in the United States don't seek recognition proceedings in Mexico. That is I think the clear inference for what you're seeing play out in these cases. The four cases that have been cited by the petitioning Creditors and their expert, Aero Mexico, Sat Mex, Max Com, and Posadas, all of those cases involve voluntary Chapter 11s in the United States, Debtor supported plans, approval by shareholder, or no impact on the equity.

But critically, none of them involve any attempt to enforce plans in Mexico or even obtain recognition in Mexico, which is a pretty remarkable thing when you consider the fact that these companies clearly have substantial presence in Mexico.

I'll turn next to, briefly, to some of the evidence on the subject of the Debtors' -- of the alleged Debtors' COMI. As I mentioned before, Mr. Guerra's testimony and conclusion and opinions that the alleged Debtors have their COMI in the United States is, we submit, not credible. Slide 11 or Slide 10 has 20 -- reflects that

25 of the alleged Debtors are incorporated in Mexico. We've circled those in red here. Only three of the alleged Debtors are incorporated or organized under U.S. law. Substantially all of the alleged Debtors' business is in Mexico. Mexico City is where the principal -- where TV Aztec's principal place of business is. It's where the alleged Debtors' management is located. It's where TV Aztec's board is located, their controlling shareholder.

It's where 37 of the 50 subsidiaries, that includes non-Debtor subsidiaries, are located -- incorporated. It's where over 3,000 of their employees, 94 percent of their employees are located. It's where 94 percent of their revenues are generated or were in 2022. The Mexican government regulates them. It's where almost all of their real property is located. It's the center of all of the alleged Debtors have commercial relationships. It's where the majority of their Creditors are and counterparties.

I'm going to turn next to the dispute about whether there's an establishment in the United States.

There is no dispute that there are establishments for all of the alleged Debtors in Mexico. That much is agreed on. And as I've explained, that has significant consequences for this case. There is certainly no evidence that all 35 of the alleged Debtors have an establishment in the United

States. There are arguments that have been made that are really directed to, at most, three or four of the alleged Debtors that have contract -- that are contract counterparties, and that have commercial relationships with parties in the United States. I've reproduced on Slide 12 the LCM provision that is similar to what's in the Model Law that provides that an establish shall be understood as any place of operations where the merchant exercises an economic activity with human and material resources or services in a non-transitory manner.

We've also reproduced Sections 89 and 90 of the Model Laws guide to Enactment which provides some of the other considerations that courts have considered in relationship -- not just Mexican courts, but courts in the U.S., for example, have found these instructive in connection with evaluating establishment. And occasional place of operations can't be classified as an establishment. There's no presumption with respect to the determination of establishment.

The alleged Debtors, or some of them, used to have an establishment. That was a long time ago. The alleged Debtors used to operate a network in the United States. It was called Azteca America. It operated in the U.S. through U.S. subsidiaries. It was sold to HC2, which is an unaffiliated third party, and that sale happened in 2017.

Thereafter, HC2 operated TV Azteca America Network. That was on the air until 2022. It ceased in December of 2022. That network is discontinued. It does not continue to broadcast in the United States. And so what remains today are what I'll vestigial entities. They are entities that were originally set up when there was a network when there was business here. And they do continue to exist, and they are contract counterparties to certain U.S. parts.

Most of those agreements, and they're in the evidence, and I'll comment a little bit more on them shortly, but most of those agreements are a very short duration and for isolated projects and individual show.

Things of that nature. If Your Honor would turn to the next slide. In evidence on the -- in the stipulated list of exhibits there are 38 contracts in evidence that are relied upon by the petitioning Creditors to show the existence of an establishment to which only four of the alleged Debtors are parties.

I'm not including in that group contracts with GSI. I'll address GSI separately. Of those contracts, 17 are on their face expired or terminated if you look at them. There are 21 that just by their terms are not expired. The 21 contracts are with 11 counterparties. So for example, there's five contracts with PGA, three with Amazon, and so on. And the contracts predominantly involve licenses for

third parties to use content that's developed in Mexico, outside of Mexico. And with respect to the current contracts, many of those as I mentioned are, in fact, short term contracts that will expire within the next two years.

If Your Honor would turn to the next slide, I want to address specifically the Univision contract. We've heard testimony and we heard questioning yesterday about the Univision contract. That is a contract that Azteca International Corporation, AIC, has entered into with Univision. It is a seven-year contract that was a prior contract that existed. The actual work, everything related to that contract is in Mexico.

Univision the right to broadcast in the United States the soccer games for two Mexican soccer league teams. The TV Azteca networks in Mexico, they broadcast these games in Mexico to Mexican audiences, and they send a signal, a TV signal to Univision. They give them a stream. It's the same broadcast. It is shown in the United States on Univision, but that's the contract.

If you'd turn to the next slide, there's also been discussion in the past about PGA contracts. There are several of those. What those contracts allow TV Azteca to do is host -- and it's Azteca Sports is the actual contract counterparty, but what happens under those contracts is

there's a golf tournament in Mexico. And that's a PGA golf tournament. It's organized. It's sponsored. It happens in Mexico. It is broadcast in Mexico by TV Azteca. There are rights under certain of the agreements to have a broadcast in the United States, but they don't have a network in the United States.

If Your Honor would turn to the next slide, I'll touch briefly on GSI. There's a lot about GSI in the petitioning Creditor's opposition brief. We heard some questioning about it yesterday. The claim that TV Azteca maintains operations in the U.S. through GSI is untrue and completely unproven by this evidentiary record. GSI is a third party contractor. It performs certain legal and consulting services. There are employees at and in particular two lawyers who work at GSI who were formerly TV Azteca employees when TV Azteca had U.S. operations.

Because it used to have a network here.

Those -- a couple of those people work at GSI, and they're lawyers, and they perform legal services. There are matters of U.S. law that need to be addressed by TV Azteca. That is principally the work that they do. They also have agreements that allow for other consulting services from time to time, but Mr. Rodriguez testified at his deposition that the current services are limited and primarily involve legal advice.

So ultimately, the record on COMI is crystal clear. The COMI for these entities given their management, their operations, what they do, what their business is, clearly Mexico. And the notion that three U.S. subs that are essentially paper counterparties to other U.S. entities could drag -- could cause a Mexican court to conclude that TV Azteca is a -- has its center of main interest in the United States is not, we submit, credible. It would be like concluding that because Comcast or NBC had one or two or three -- Mr. Guerra says one is enough, but let's say three deminimis Mexican subsidiaries, a court might conclude that those, you know, major American companies have, in fact, their COMI in Mexico.

The record on establishment is contested.

Professor Mejan offered his opinion. That opinion was based on the declarations of Mr. Rodriguez. Those declarations describe the contractual relationships with various parties.

They describe the nature of the alleged Debtors' U.S. operations, which don't exist, and the Mexican operations.

That conclusion is well supported. It may, at most, be a litigation in Mexico about whether there is an establishment here for a very small number of alleged Debtors. At most.

I want to turn next to the subject of litigation in Mexico because we have obviously heard quite a bit about litigation in Mexico and injunctions that have been issued

by Mexico courts. At the outset of these involuntary cases, the alleged Debtors made a choice. They chose to file an involuntary Chapter 11 case in this court instead of initiating an involuntary concurso case. That decision, we submit on the record, was not made because they believed that they were enjoined from filing an involuntary concurso case at the outset of these cases. Their statement in support of their petition, filings in connection with the stay motion to be sure complained about the Mexican litigations and raised the Mexican litigations as an issue, but they did not say we are filing in this court because we want to file in Mexico, but we can't file in Mexico.

There was a form preference that we submit was motivating the petitions. There have been allegations or claims about the secret nature of the proceedings in Mexico or the secret nature of filings or ex parte relief. Mr.

Guerra confirmed that as a matter of Mexican practice they complied with Mexican law. There's not a claim that under Mexican law by Mr. Guerra that procedurally there was something improper about the way that those cases were filed in terms of the disclosure are pursued.

The petitioning Creditors have been served with one of the injunctions. They're litigating that. They have filed a motion to vacate. They have challenged other rulings of the Mexican court, one of which was successfully

challenged. There was a ruling early on about the amount of time to answer one of the complaints. There was a ruling against them. They obtained a ruling in their favor.

They're litigating those cases. The cases, though, have not -- did not have -- before these petitions were filed, they have no effect on the actual litigation that was pending at that time before Judge Gardephe.

There was not an argument that was -- they were not advanced in the briefing before Judge Gardephe as a basis to deny their summary judgment motion. There were other arguments about the summary judgment motion that Ms. Cornish will touch on later, but they were not advanced as a basis to not file them or to rule against them on those motions.

Mejan opined that the injunctions that have been issued by the Mexican courts do not prevent the commencement of an involuntary concurso proceeding. The experts disagree. Mr. Guerra has offered the opinion that they would have that effect, but that is the only basis in the record to reach that conclusion. It is Mr. Guerra's speculation about what would happen. That proposition was never tested. There were never -- there was never a concurso filed on an involuntary basis in Mexico which would tell us what the effect of the injunctions actually is.

We submit that Mr. Guerra's speculation about that subject given his other credibility issues, given the fact that he actually provided the parties with a copy of an injunction that specifically enjoined bankruptcy cases and undermined the rest of his opinion on the effect of the existing injunctions should not be granted.

I'll turn now on Page 21 to a discussion of the law, U.S. law, on Section 305(a)(1). Section 305(a)(1) allows the court, after noticing a hearing, to dismiss the case under this title if the interests of Creditors and the Debtor would be better served by such dismissal. The standard under the case law is met when there is no reasonable likelihood that the Debtor intended to reorganize, and no reasonable probability that it would eventually emerge from bankruptcy proceedings. The objective futility -- quoting from Multicanal, the objective futility of any possibility of administering a reorganization in this jurisdiction is grounds for dismissal under Section 305(a)(1). Again, that's Multicanal.

In Jacor, the Southern District of Texas case, the court dismissed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition under Section 305(a)(1) because a Mexican court may not recognize the enforceability of orders issues from a United States bankruptcy court in an involuntary proceeding against a Mexican citizen in domiciliary.

On the next slide we've collected other factors that courts consider in connection with dismissal of cases under Section 305(a)(1). And again, I touched on these earlier, but because of the need for a concurso and because of the conflicts between concurso law and how concurso would proceed and U.S. law, keeping these cases here would not promote the economy and efficiency of administration of any reorganization.

Another forum is available. It is there. It is the necessary forum. There is no way to avoid that forum. Chapter 11 cases are not necessary, we submit, to reach any just or equitable distribution of assets because they cannot be administered here. And again, all of the factors that courts look to we submit compel dismissal here.

I'd like to turn next to Multicanal specifically, talk a little bit about Multicanal and Globalpar. We heard about both of those cases yesterday. So Multicanal has a lot of similarities to this case. In Multicanal, the court considered an involuntary Chapter 11 petition for an Argentine company headquartered in Buenos Aires. 90 percent of Multicanal's operations were in Argentina. Multicanal's U.S.-based assets were three bank accounts with an aggregate balance of approximately \$9,500.

Multicanal did issue U.S. denominated -- U.S. dollar denominated notes pursuant to a New York governed

adenture. Those notes accounted for about 97 percent of Multicanal's debt according to Judge Gropper's opinion. The U.S. notes were registered with the SEC, and those notes were marketed and sold with the assistance of U.S. advisors and underwriters in the United States. And on the record there, Judge Gropper found that in that case -- he commented that the motives of the involuntary Petitioners are less important than the objective futility of any possibility of administering a reorganization in this jurisdiction and stated that a motion to dismiss -- on a motion to dismiss I should say, a court must take into account its ability to enforce its own orders.

He continued that a concurrent U.S. case would conflict with rather than compliment based on the expert testimony there an insolvency proceeding in Argentina, and it would not be recognized in Argentina under Argentine insolvency law. And that was again a basis to dismiss the petition.

Globopar is not to the contrary. Globopar involved a Brazilian company. It was headquartered in Brazil. All of its employees, principal offices, principal place of business was also located in Brazil. Vast majority of Globopar's property was there, but Globopar also had issued over a billion dollars of U.S. dollar denominated debt, including approximately 750 million, which expressly

subjected, according to the opinion, Globopar to jurisdiction of New York courts for actions arising out of the bondo.

And it was also the case that at Globopar there was expert testimony that was unrebutted that said, quoting from the opinion -- this is 317 B.R. 235 at 244 Note 4 that it seems likely that a Brazilian court would refuse to recognize any judgments or orders issued by the bankruptcy court related to Globopar. The district court in Globopar did reverse and remand a decision by the bankruptcy court in that case.

The reversal, though, was based on the fact that the bankruptcy court had failed to develop a sufficient factual record in the case and had failed to address arguments that had been made by the parties on issues like jurisdiction and service of process among other things. And there's a lot of frustration when you read Globopar in the fact that the bankruptcy court had failed to develop a record or articulate reasons for all of its rulings.

But the Globopar court did observe, based on the record as it was presented to that court, that the case was in fact a strong one for abstention based on the record.

And the Court noted that, and I'm quoting, "Potential lack of cooperation from Globopar, foreign Creditors, and the Brazilian courts would certainly stand as a significant

impediment to the orderly administration of Globopar's bankruptcy estate since there's no indication that the bankruptcy court would be able to obtain the cooperation of foreign Creditors who are not subject to bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. And a Brazilian court may not compel to participate in any United States bankruptcy proceeding.

Such considerations may well weigh heavily in the bankruptcy court's assessment of factors enumerated by Section 305(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code or by other jurisdictional and equitable dockets." And again, if the court -- this is a quote, "The petition appears to represent a strong candidate for abstention."

Now, Globopar, and this is summarized on Page 27, did say in relation to Multicanal that it did not agree, and I'm quote, "Did not agree with a legal conclusion reached in a decision otherwise well-reasoned recently issued by another bankruptcy court in this district." And that's referring to Multicanal. The specific point that the Globopar court identified in Multicanal was that Multicanal stated in the course of the decision that it would be on -- that there was concern by the court that it would be unable to exercise effective jurisdiction.

And what Globopar says is, well, the bankruptcy courts with in personum jurisdiction. That how it obtains in rem jurisdiction, and that was not addressed in the

manner that that an analysis should proceed. That was essentially the criticism of Multicanal. But Globopar did not say that on the facts of Multicanal abstention was inappropriate. Globopar said the opposite. I submit that Globopar, notwithstanding the dismissal of the lower court's opinion, actually supports dismissal in this case and abstention in this case. And of course, you only need to reach 305(a)(1) abstention if there is jurisdiction in the first place.

I'm going to touch briefly and only briefly on forum non-convenience. For many of the same reasons -- I'm on Slide 29. For many of the same reasons, that dismissal is warranted under Section 305(a)(1). Forum non-convenience dismissal is appropriate. The factors that guide the court's discretion under forum non-convenience we submit is the court's dismissal. I'll highlight only a few points on this topic because essentially it is the same facts ultimately that I have discussed before in relation to the alleged Debtors.

The petitioning Creditors here are not U.S.

entities. They are foreign funds. They were organized

under the law of the Caymans. They were organized under the

law of Luxemburg. They are managed by U.S. advisors, or

they have U.S. investment advisors, but they're not U.S.

funds.

And Your Honor, if I may, I'm going to go a little bit out of order, but if I may direct your attention to Slide 32, this is an excerpt from the offering circular that accompanied the notes originally. It stated not for distribution to any U.S. persons. This offering is available only to non-U.S. persons within the meaning of the Regulation S and the U.S. Securities Act of 1933.

On the next slide, the offering circular also described, notwithstanding the forum selection clause that is in the indenture that relates to disputes about the notes, that there was a risk that the issuer and the guarantors could become subject to a concurso mercantile.

That is a bankruptcy proceeding in Mexico. That risk would not be there if there was exclusive jurisdiction over a bankruptcy case in New York.

And my last comment on this subject is only that I'm not aware of a case that says a form selection clause in one creditor's agreement should dictate where a plenary restructuring proceeding should take place. There are other credit -- there's a credit agreement with a secured lender that has a Mexican forum selection clause. Courts routinely consider that forum selection clauses are outweighed by other considerations in the bankruptcy context. And with that, I will cede the podium to Ms. Cornish.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Clareman.

Pg 31 of 169 Page 31 1 MS. CORNISH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 3 MS. CORNISH: Good afternoon. Kelley Cornish from Paul Weiss on behalf of the alleged Debtors. Your Honor, 4 5 one comment about the slide deck that Mr. Clareman has been walking through, while the contents of the slide deck 7 certainly mirror and include all of the matters that I'm 8 going to cover, I'm not going to follow it verbatim. 9 THE COURT: That's fine. I take notes too --MS. CORNISH: Yeah, I --10 11 THE COURT: -- in case you haven't noticed. 12 MS. CORNISH: I've watched. I've seen them, 13 copious notes. Your Honor, most of the briefing in these 14 matters, and essentially all of yesterday's hearing have 15 been devoted to dealing -- or to dueling expert testimony 16 and argument about the interplay of U.S. and Mexican 17 insolvency law if TV Azteca can be forced into a bankruptcy 18 proceeding here. 19 As Mr. Clareman has extensively argued, we believe 20 that this court should dismiss these involuntary cases 21 because any Chapter 11 plan approved by this court must be 22 subjected to a do-over essentially in a full-blown Mexican 23 concurso. Mexican law in material respects is incompatible

with the petitioning Creditors contemplated in voluntary

plan in these cases resulting in undue delay, expense, and

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value degradation in detriment of the Debtors' enterprise and stakeholders.

Aside, Your Honor, from the abstention grounds and forum non-convenience grounds that Mr. Clareman just covered, there are two what we think are silver bullet type independent bases for dismissal of these cases under the bankruptcy code, applicable case law, and the simple undisputed facts that relate to them.

First, Your Honor, the petitioning Creditors are ineligible to bring these cases under Section 303(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code because a portion of the claim on the notes that they hold is subject -- is the subject of a bona fide dispute as to amount. And that is, Your Honor, the \$16.5 million redemption premium that is part of the claim under the notes.

Although the petitioning Creditors are now trying to walk away from that disputed portion of the claim on their notes to avoid the standing issue here, they cannot do that. Both the directing holders, which included the petitioning Creditors or some of them, and the indentured Trustee at their direction are seeking payment of a \$16.5 million redemption premium under the notes. And that issue is squarely joined and pending before Judge Gardephe in the district court litigation that was commenced by the indenture Trustee.

That dispute cannot simply be circumvented here for standing purposes by the petitioning Creditors. And I'll come back to this argument in more detail. Second, these cases should be dismissed for cause under Bankruptcy Code Section 1112(b). They are nothing more than a two-party dispute filed by the petitioning Creditors because they lost patience with the action on the notes that they directed the indenture Trustee to commence in New York State court, and are frustrated with litigation pending in Mexico, which incidentally, Your Honor, has done nothing to disrupt their lawsuit that's pending here in the Southern District.

Let's begin, Your Honor, with the petitioning

Creditors' standing under Section 303(b)(1). To have

standing to commence an involuntary case under that section,

a petitioning Creditor must not be "the subject of a bona

fide dispute as to liability or amount." The case law is

clear that the petitioning Creditor must satisfy both the

liability and the amount prong of 303(b)(1). And there are

cases cited in the slides.

Also, Your Honor, each and every one of the Southern District New York bankruptcy judges who have considered this issue, and they include Judge Morris, Judge Drain, and Judge Bernstein, plus the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit, and the Fifth Circuits have held that a bona fide dispute as to a portion of a petitioning creditor's

claim is sufficient to render that creditor ineligible to file a voluntary case under the bankruptcy code. Your Honor, the full citations to those cases are, you know, included in the slide decks and in our briefs. I won't go through them.

Here, it is undeniable that a live dispute is joined and is pending before Judge Gardephe with respect to the noteholder's claim for a \$16.5 million redemption premium under the notes. A brief review of the history of the notes is illuminating for these purposes. And I will reference Your Honor to Page 46 of the slide deck, which has a timeline, but I'll walk through it. I'll walk through some of it anyway.

Your Honor, the notes were issued in February of 2017 by TZ Azteca. In February 2021, TV Azteca announced deferral of an interest payment, and subsequently also then missed additional payments. Notably, and this, Your Honor, is on Page 38. There's a demonstrative on Page 38 of the slide deck. It relates to the petitioning Creditors' purchase of the notes and the timing of it.

So as Slide Deck 38 -- or Page 38 of the slide deck shows, the petitioning Creditors first purchased their notes the day after the first missed interest payment. They were not initial par purchasers. Your Honor, we've also included in the joint exhibits at Pages 164 to 204 Bloomberg

screenshots that reflect the steeply discounted market prices of the notes at points in the timeline when the petitioning Creditors purchased their notes. And essentially, they're somewhere in the .42 to .44 cent range.

As -- also, Your Honor, we included, oh, the demonstrative deck, which I've already pointed you to. In May of 2022, back to the timeline of the litigation and events leading to the litigation, in May of 2022, the beneficial holders of more than 25 percent of the notes issued a notice of acceleration expressly seeking payment of "premium, if any". And that's at Joint Exhibit 13 at Page 2.

On August 5, 2022, the indenture Trustee issued a notice of acceleration that incidentally did not mention premium, and that's Joint Exhibit 14 at Page 1. Three days later, however, at the direction of the directing noteholders, the indenture Trustee amended the notice to add reference to a "premium". That's Joint Exhibit 15 at Page 1.

Later that month, the indenture Trustee commenced litigation on the notes by filing summary judgment in lieu of complaint in New York State court expressly including a demand for payment of a \$16.5 million redemption premium.

And that's at Joint Exhibit 2, Page 22. The following month very promptly TV Azteca removed that action to the Southern

District of New York and filed an opposition to the indenture Trustee's motion in that court. And the indenture Trustee subsequently filed a reply. The issue of whether a redemption premium is due and owing on the note is squarely joined in these pleadings and is currently pending before Judge Gardephe.

In fact, the issue is addressed no less than ten times in the parties' pleadings, and you can find those pleadings, Your Honor, Joint Exhibit 140 is TV Azteca's opposition and Joint Exhibit 4 is the reply. Meanwhile, as I previously mentioned, I'll just note the petitioning Creditors have continued to buy notes throughout this entire period of time at a steep discount.

Probably recognizing that they had an issue satisfying 303(b)(1)'s requirement that their claims not be the subject of a bona fide dispute as to amount, the petitioning Creditors are now trying to sidestep that issue by, first omitting from their statement in support of these involuntary cases any mention whatsoever of the directing holders or the indenture Trustee's assertions of the disputed claim under the notes for a redemption premium.

Specifically, Your Honor, in Paragraph 2 of their statement, they intentionally incompletely state, "On August 5, 2022, noteholders owning a majority of outstanding principal amount of notes, including the petitioning

Creditors, directed the indentured Trustee to send an acceleration notice to TV Azteca upon which principal and interest", that's the only reference, "immediately became due and payable. The directing holders then directed the indentured Trustee to initiate a suit in New York State Supreme Court seeking a judgment for the principal and interest," no reference to premium, "due under the indenture." And that's at Paragraph 2, Your Honor, of their statement in support. And again, they just conspicuously omit from their description of their claim under the notes payment of a redemption principal -- premium. Excuse me.

The redemption premiums I've mentioned was expressly made, that claim, by the indenture Trustee at the directing holders', including the petitioning Creditors, direction in two places. One, if you look at the supplemental notice, which I've already made reference to, of acceleration dated August 8th, it reads, "The Trustee by this notice declares the unpaid principal of \$400 million premium accrued in unpaid interest and any other amounts owed under the notes to be due and payable immediately as provided under Section 6.21(a) of the indenture."

And then the second summary of the claim is in the memo of law in support of summary judgment in lieu of complaint, specifically in the list of relief that's being sought. Page 6 says, "Award Plaintiff premium consistent

with the redemption premium at a rate of 104.125 percent of the principal as of the date of acceleration, August 5, 2022, as provided in Section 5.1 of the indenture for a premium totaling \$16,500,000." As I've mentioned, TV Azteca disputes that the redemption premium is due under the Second Circuit's 2017 MPM decision, and that issue has been extensively brief and is pending for decision before Judge Gardephe in the Southern District of New York action.

Your Honor, the Plaintiff's attempt to ignore the bona fide dispute that exists with respect to the amount due on the notes arising from the redemption premium is just ineffective here. There is undeniably a pending dispute with respect to a portion of the noteholder's claims under the notes. If this court proceeds with these involuntary cases, the noteholder's claim, including whether they can collect the redemption premium under the notes, will have to be adjudicated to determine the noteholder's treatment under any plan.

The petitioning Creditors are noteholders who will be bound by their class's treatment under any plan. Despite their attempt to insulate themselves from ineligibility to file these cases under 303(b)(1) today by purporting to waive the disputed redemption premium of their claim on the notes, that dispute must be resolved with respect to the notes if these cases go forward.

Likewise, very similarly, the petitioning Creditor in Mountain Dairies, Judge Morris' case that looked at these issues, tried to waive disputed portions of its claim for purposes of obtaining standing to file an involuntary Chapter 7 case. But Judge Morris noted that, "There is no doubt that the dispute over the amount of the petitioning Creditor's claim would continue after the entry of an order for relief." The petitioning Creditor would have this court find no dispute for purposes of the threshold requirement of an undisputed claim, and then have this court resolve multifaceted disputes over the amount of that claim.

Judge Morris found that, "Those concessions do not, as the petitioning Creditor contends, eliminate the bona fide dispute." She dismissed the involuntary case on standing grounds. Also on abstention grounds, but it -- but on standing grounds. And that's the Mountain Dairies case at Page 634. Subsequently commenting on Judge Morris' reasoning in a later involuntary Chapter 7 case, Judge Drain in the Persico case noted that the Mountain Dairies petitioning Creditor's attempt to "concede the validity of the Debtor's amount of its claim as resolving their dispute for the purposes of the involuntary petition was no concession at all." And that's at Page 2 of the Persico Westlaw -- it was an oral decision from the bench, Judge.

The petitioning Creditors' attempt here to waive

the disputed portion of their claim on the notes for a redemption premium for purposes of establishing standing to file these involuntary cases is the same as in Mountain Dairies. In the words of Judge Drain in Persico, such a concession "would not count as a waiver at all, and the petitioning Creditor would not satisfy the amount in dispute issue." Again, Page 2 of the Persico decision.

In sum, Your Honor, the petitioning Creditors are ineligible to file these involuntary cases because the redemption premium portion of the noteholder's claims -- claim under the notes is the subject of a bona fide dispute in the action before Judge Gardephe.

Your Honor, aside from the fact that the petitioning Creditors lack standing here, these cases should be dismissed for cause due to what courts have recognized as "a common practice, the filing of a case under the bankruptcy code as a tactic in a two-party dispute" for which adequate remedies exist at state law. And that quote, Your Honor, is from Judge Gerber in the Murray bankruptcy court level decision. And that Murray case is a really important case I think in this area, and which resulted in a dismissal of an involuntary Chapter 7 filing that went all the way up to the Second Circuit and was affirmed in the Second Circuit. And I'll be coming back to Murray.

Your Honor, what Judge Gerber referred to, we

believe, is precisely what is going on here. As we've highlighted extensively throughout the proceedings, last year a group of noteholders, including the petitioning Creditors, directed the indenture Trustee to accelerate the notes and file litigation in New York State court to recover payment on the notes. TV Azteca promptly removed that case to the federal district court, and the parties have been litigating there primarily with respect to whether the redemption premium is due and payable.

Fully briefed summary judgment motions currently are pending before Judge Gardephe, and obviously that case has been stayed by these filings. Apparently impatient with Judge Gardephe and frustrated by litigation occurring in Mexico, the petitioning Creditors decided to attempt to use the bankruptcy code and this busy court to bring their dispute with TV Azteca to a head. Incidentally, Your Honor, we've mentioned this before -- actually, a separate point, excuse me.

Incidentally, the petitioning Creditors never once pressed Judge Gardephe for a decision on the motion that's pending before him or advised him of any reason for expediting that decision. Tellingly, the petitioning Creditors' three-page preliminary statement in their statement that was filed in support of these cases, if you look at those three pages, and I'm not going to -- I don't

have a slide laying them out, but if you go back and look at them and read them, you will see that that entire preliminary statement speaks only of the dispute between the TV Azteca and noteholders under the notes. That's it.

It makes no reference whatsoever to any other debts or Creditors, or to any financial or operational matters requiring a plenary reorganization of TV Azteca in the United States or in Mexico. In fact, Judge, the ultimate description of their motivation for filing these cases in that preliminary statement, if you go to Page 4 of that preliminary statement, I think it's the last paragraph, it's quite telling. It smacks of nothing but a two-party dispute.

It says, "The Debtor's actions leave the petitioning Creditors no choice but to seek relief from this court. Without intervention by this court, the noteholders will be permanently harmed, stripped of any due process rights through baseless litigation in Mexico, all of their contractual rights under their New York law governed indenture, and left without a remedy to seek recovery." All about the notes and frustration.

Judge Gerber in the Murray case dismissed, as I mentioned, an involuntary Chapter 7 case "for cause under Section 1112(b) when a single Creditor tried to invoke the involuntary provisions as its personal judgment enforcement

device." In Murray, as I've mentioned, the parties were engaged in highly contentious protracted litigation for years until the judgment Creditor ultimately filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition before Judge Gerber. In dismissing the case, Judge Gerber focused exclusively on the purpose and policy underlying the bankruptcy system explaining that "bankruptcy is a collective remedy with the original purpose which continues to this day to address the needs and concerns of creditors with competing demands to debtor's assets and with the understandable desire that the debtor's assets not go to the swiftest or most aggressive of them.

"Over the years, the bankruptcy system's purposes expanded to accomplish other important social goals to bring an end to debtor's prison, to provide for a discharge, to rehabilitate debtors, and thus to capture going concern value for the benefits of the creditor community as contrasted to selling off assets for scrap and to save jobs, and to benefit the communities in which debtors operate. If any of those goals needed to be achieved here, a bankruptcy case likely, if not plainly, would make sense."

But Judge Gerber -- that's the end of the quote,

Judge Gerber concluded in Murray that none of those policy

goals were implicated. Rather, he found that the bankruptcy

court cannot properly be employed as a rented battlefield to

achieve ends for which it never was intended as a collection mechanism to achieve none of the goals the court just noted. And in reaching his decision, Judge Gerber, I would note and emphasize, gave no consideration whatsoever to how long it was taking or how difficult it had been and was for the petitioning creditor to obtain the relief it was seeking in the years of underlying litigation. I just -- I noticed that you were -- I was just waiting. That's okay.

THE COURT: No, that's all right.

MS. CORNISH: In the years of underlying litigation. And in fact, I will also note in terms of adequate remedy of law, in Murray, the judgment creditor was seeking relief, had the ability to get expanded relief in the bankruptcy case under the bankruptcy codes as opposed to in the underlying litigation. And that did not factor in at all.

Judge Gerber, rather, went on to list the undisputed facts in Murray demonstrating there was nothing but a two-party dispute before him. Most are remarkably similar to these cases, and you'll see in the slide deck we actually line these up, but I'll go through them now orally. Judge Gerber noted or listed the facts as follows. This court is the most recent battlefield in the longstanding two-party disputes. This case has been brought solely as a judgment enforcement mechanism. There are no creditors

competing with each other to be first in line to collect on claims. There were no other creditors to help.

Assuming arguendo that there were any fraudulent transfers that could be avoided and then recovered, the petitioning Creditor could -- Creditors could do so on its own without resorting to the bankruptcy court. The petitioning Creditor has adequate remedies under non-bankruptcy law, obviously referring, Your Honor, to the pending litigation and etcetera. Further, no assets would be lost or dissipated in the event that the bankruptcy case did not continue.

The petitioning Creditors' interest in the

judgment -- there it was a judgment enforcement proceeding

as opposed to a pending litigation -- and its ability to

enforce the judgment against the Debtor will remain.

Finally, the Debtor does not need or want a discharge. Your

Honor, similar undisputed facts are present here. First,

the petitioning Creditors filed these cases while litigation

that they commenced in New York State court is pending

providing them an adequate remedy under non-bankruptcy law.

I would also note that there's potentially an involuntary proceeding in Mexico as well, but we can focus on the New York State pending litigation. No other -- second, no other creditors have come forward here in this matter seeking the assistance of a bankruptcy process in the

U.S. or Mexico, for that matter. Although the pendency of these cases has been widely publicized, including in the financial press and in TV Azteca's securities filings. As Your Honor knows, Diamond, a judgment Creditor, did appear at the initial hearing in these cases, but has shown no interest in participating since then and forcing TV Azteca into a full-blown bankruptcy. Presumably, Diamond is content to continue its own two-party dispute with TV Azteca outside of this court.

There is currently no evidence of dissipation of TV Azteca's assets in Mexico, here, or otherwise, or a race to the bottom to collect on debts by multiple creditors or constituents of creditors. There is no evidence that TV Azteca is in need of a comprehensive financial or operational restructuring. Rather, the petitioning Creditors' reorganization plan that they intend to file after terminating TV Azteca's exclusivity would be their intent.

That plan, that contemplated plan on its face demonstrates that they do not intend to effect a true reorganization of TV Azteca's debts or business as described by Judge Gerber in Murray or is contemplated. To the contrary, their purpose -- they propose, excuse me, to force the entire TV Azteca enterprise into prolonged expensive and value destructive U.S. involuntary Chapter 11 cases that

would admittedly have to be followed by a full-blown Mexican concurso. That would affect the notes and try to affect equity, although as we've, we think, shown through Mr.

Mejan's testimony can't do it. Everyone else under that contemplated plan is unaffected. We don't need the bankruptcy court to, as they contemplate, treat the taxing authorities and oversight of the ITF "in accordance with applicable non-bankruptcy law." Don't need the bankruptcy courts for that.

In addition, reinstating the revolving credit facility for Banco Azteca, don't need that. Reinstate general unsecured Creditors' claims. So again, this smacks of a two-party dispute. Nobody else is being affected other than equity that cannot be. Your Honor, the petitioning Creditors' plan is not a reorganization operationally or financially at all. Again, no Creditor claims other than the notes will be affected.

As the Second Circuit said in Murray, "After considering the purpose of involuntary petitions, the goals of the bankruptcy code, and the bankruptcy court's authority under Section 1112(b)" the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Gerber's dismissal in Murray of the involuntary chapter filing for cause explaining that, "Such a remedy exists as an avenue of relief for the benefit of the overall Creditor body. It was not intended to address the special

grievances, not matter how legitimate of particular

Creditors. Such Creditors must seek redress under state law
in the state courts and not in the bankruptcy court."

The reasoning and holding in the Murray decisions by Judge Gerber all the way up to the Second Circuit we think are applicable here, Judge. The indenture Trustee and TV Azteca have been litigating over the notes in an action commenced by the indenture Trustee, which provides the noteholders with an adequate remedy at law. There are no other Creditors that have come forward seeking to participate in a reorganization of TV Azteca here or in Mexico.

The petitioning Creditors' own contemplated plan would seek to impair or affect only the noteholders' claims other than equity, which they cannot do. As demonstrated in their own statement in support of these cases, Your Honor, the petitioning Creditors are not proposing a reorganization of TV Azteca for the benefit of all of its stakeholders and to maximize value and recovery on all of their claims in interests, or to avoid the future dissipation of assets or a liquidation of TV Azteca, or to preserve TV Azteca as a going concern.

None of those goals are implicated here. Rather, the petitioning Creditors have decided to change forums to exert maximum pressure to recover on their notes, which they

1 purchased with eyes wide open and at a steep discount. 2 Judge Gardephe is already handling that two-party dispute. 3 These cases should be dismissed for cause under Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thank you, Your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. I guess I'll just start asking 6 my questions, and then you two can figure out who's 7 answering them. Okay. When I reviewed the pleadings before 8 Judge Gardephe, which as you imagine I have not only 9 reviewed the ones that are in the binders, but I've reviewed 10 all of them, as well as all of the ones in the state court 11 because I'm allowed to take judicial notice of anything 12 that's happening in some court, it didn't seem to me that 13 there was any argument made by the alleged Debtors as to the 14 principal amount and whether that's due and owing. Is that 15 right? 16 MR. CLAREMAN: Your Honor, that's correct. 17 argument was not made in the pleadings in the matter before 18 Judge Gardephe. 19 THE COURT: But yet we've -- I've read the 20 pleadings in Mexico in the -- I'll call it the unserved 21 injunction litigation, and certainly the language of those 22 pleadings goes beyond what one would expect in an injunction, which is just to stop things from happening. 23 But the underlying action beyond just the initial injunction 24

seems to argue about whether there was validity to various I

guess acceleration was his word given. Is that right?

MR. CLAREMAN: That is correct with respect to 3 pleadings in Mexico, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So can you explain why the Debtor is making one argument in the United States and another argument in Mexico?

MR. CLAREMAN: Well, the way I would answer it is just to say that I'm not a Mexican lawyer, and the arguments that can be made in a Mexican court are arguments that Mexican lawyers have made, will made, if they're -- and if they are -- should be dismissed, they should be set aside and not --

THE COURT: How about there's no jurisdiction based on the contract that you all agreed to in the indenture for the Mexican court to be dealing with any of those issues? And the fact that you all have commenced actions seeking that is in violation of your contract. Now, look, it's clearly not what's before Judge Gardephe. He has no idea based on the papers that are filed before him, at least that I could see, about what's going on in terms of Mexico unless people have filed these things that I've only recently seen with the translations to him.

So how would he then know that this argument is being made? But regardless, you know, the Debtor signed a contract that says -- and I think no one disputes this part

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of it. I understand there's a dispute about what does it mean vis-a-vis my proceeding here today, but I think at least with respect to the issue of where issues about adjudication of the notes, and what's owed under the terms of the indenture, and whether potential provisions of the indenture were complied with or not, what's owed based on the indenture, that this is all subject to New York law and a New York forum by virtue of the agreement of the parties in Section 11.7.

So I'm having a really hard time understanding what the legal basis is for this litigation and it happening elsewise. The reason that I'm asking about this is you're asking me to take a position as to what's going on Judge Gardephe's court with respect to whether there's a bona fide dispute. Okay. Understand the argument on the premium.

Obviously, I've read Momentum myself of course. Never mind that we were involved in it. Not me, but other people years ago. And of course I'm familiar with cases such as American Airlines, some of the other things that Momentum cites to because some of those cases I was involved in myself, and also the state court issues with respect to premiums.

So I understand there's a dispute there, and I think that's laid out before Judge Gardephe, and I get that. But it seems to me that I have a secondary dispute going on here and that no one's asserted before Judge Gardephe. But

yet it is asserted in two different courts about the principal. So what position am I supposed to take with respect to that? It seems to me that I have to take a position that, based on my reading of this indenture that wasn't asserted in front of Judge Gardephe, it can't possibly be a bona fide dispute. Because a bona fide dispute has to comply with what people agree to. MR. CLAREMAN: So, Your Honor, this is -- I would answer your question as (indiscernible). I don't disagree with what Your Honor has said as a matter of New York law with respect to the indenture and what it means. arguments have not been made in front of Judge Gardephe that are -- no arguments inconsistent with what Your Honor has said have been made in front of Judge Gardephe. THE COURT: Right. I've read it. Yep. MR. CLAREMAN: And what I would suggest is if there is an issue in terms of actions being taken that are in some manner interfering with Judge Gardephe's ability to handle the case, Judge --THE COURT: He needs to know about them. MR. CLAREMAN: That is -- of course that's true. That's true, but that request can -- that sort of relief can be sought by litigants in that case. There is a --THE COURT: For certain, but again, respectfully, you know, when you're litigating in front of a bankruptcy

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court or a district court, there is things that are the law that parties all understand. And I think what you all are arguing -- which I understand the argument, and I've read the indenture. I obviously have my own opinion. My own opinion doesn't matter because this won't be just decided by me necessarily. I guess maybe it could matter, but it doesn't matter for now. Judge -- it's in front of Judge Gardephe. I have my own opinion about it.

But I certainly understand the arguments that are to be made. I understand issues about premiums. Obviously, my previous life I did a lot of litigation on premiums. I know the issue. I understand it. This is, to me, taking an argument that the parties have agreed should be in front of it if someone's going to make it, in front of Judge Gardephe and his court, or for that matter my court if I kept this proceeding, but some court in New York that has jurisdiction. And it shouldn't be being made somewhere else. It almost makes me have to perhaps make a finding about the bona fide nature of that.

And if -- I'm just raising it so the people understand why this is bothering me in particular in addition to people not complying with contracts. But I also note that the fact that the court doesn't know about it bothers me a lot. And it bothers me a lot not for something that's a legal reason because I accept the arguments that

were made yesterday by your -- by the parties that they don't have to necessarily legally tell people until they're served and everything. But there's also professional conduct. We go by that in our courts.

And so I think not telling people, most importantly not telling the tribunal if it's an issue so that they're aware of it, is a problem for me. And I'm just noting that. That has nothing to do with my ruling except perhaps adding an additional potentially dispute, which may or may not be bona fide that's out there. But I note that I don't think that that -- this is appropriate conduct on the part of parties.

And so you know, you can -- however this goes, I'm just putting this on the record so -- because perhaps, who knows, Judge Gardephe might read my statement that he understands that I was distressed and don't think that that's appropriate conduct, and that he does need to be notified even in a stayed litigation about what's going on. So I think parties need to consider that.

All right. Going on to other questions, if I deny the motion to dismiss, would the alleged Debtors actually comply with their obligations under the bankruptcy code?

This seems to be an issue that actually is important.

Because on one hand, if the Debtors tell me they're not going to comply, they're not going to file schedules and

statement of affairs, they're going to ignore their fiduciary duties, they're not going to attend 341 meetings, they're not going to file monthly reports, they're not going to propose a plan. In other words, if I don't dismiss this litigation, they're just going to completely act in their own way acquit their fiduciary responsibilities, that could make things very difficult for me. Also for anybody enforcing.

On the other hand, if you actually complied with all those things, proposed your own plan, which would then be consensual on your part, whether it got confirmed or not, you'd have a consensual Chapter 11 proceeding in some ways, potentially, or certainly one that you had input in. And certainly you have exclusivity, and there's a process for that. And that might be a different situation.

One of the things I'm trying to figure out in the abstention issue is how likely is this going to be a scorched earth situation. That's my worry. And so I'm going to ask you what are you going to do.

MR. CLAREMAN: Well, let me address the question in a couple of different ways because I have a few reactions. So number one, of course, speaking for counsel, we will comply with orders of this court. There would be, I anticipate at a number of points, issues of conflict of laws that would need to be addressed in terms of what can be done

as a matter of Mexican law and what -- and how that interacts with the bankruptcy code. So I would anticipate that those issues would arise.

Ultimately, our argument is not that these cases

should be dismissed because or in anticipation of obstinance or scorched earth tactics by the alleged Debtors.

Ultimately, even in a cooperative from the alleged Debtors' perspective, in order to be enforceable in Mexico binding on shareholders, binding on the government, binding on the secured Creditors, binding on trade Creditors, the consent of the Debtor doesn't get you all the way there. You have to have a further recognition proceeding in Mexico that runs into the exact same problems they serve at.

THE COURT: Well, maybe and maybe not. I mean, no disrespect. I mean, if Group Aeromexico had started as an involuntary and ended up as a plan proposed by Group Aeroméxico that was voted in favor by their shareholders, which it was -- and for full disclosure, I did work on Group Aeroméxico before I took the bench. I wasn't there at the end, but I was there at -- for a big chunk of it. So I -- there, that's one example of where there was a consensual proceeding here in the U.S. that didn't involve having to go back to Mexico to do anything.

I mean, that could happen here if the parties did that. I don't think that's impossible. I understand that

if the parties don't have an agreement or if the parties want to -- do not have the support of the Mexican government, the Mexican government doesn't have their rights in here in this process, the Mexican government is adversely affected, other Creditors' rights are adversely affected in Mexico, you might end up with what you're saying. I completely understand that even if everybody agreed.

But there are examples. Granted, they didn't start out as involuntaries. I understand that. But if the Debtors -- it was the Debtors' plan in those circumstances, the Debtor isn't going to propose a plan here either that doesn't comply with the laws in Mexico. I can't believe that. So it strikes me as it's not impossible to get to that role if people are willing to cooperate and recognize those things. It doesn't mean every proceeding would have to end up there.

I think it could. I'm not disagreeing with that.

Certainly if the Debtors aren't on board with it and I

confirm the plan over their objection, again hypothetically,

I definitely think you'd end up back in Mexico in that

circumstance. I really don't disagree with that. I think

that would be a problem. You'd have to go back to Mexico

then. But I think it is possible for that to occur.

Sometimes people actually reach arrangements in proceedings

if they don't start out the right way.

I mean, that's the problem with what you're arguing on the other side. You're arguing about an involuntary concurso as being an option. Okay. Maybe.

Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. Why do I say maybe? I say maybe because you have to decide you're not going to get sued before the superior court on that injunction language unless it gets vacated. It's a risk. People have to decide they're going to do it.

Again, you may -- you know, your expert certainly doesn't think it's a problem. The other side thinks it's a problem. You have issues. No one knows. Hasn't been before anyone. What they did agree on is that the concurso court can't override it, so you are definitely going to be dealing with whatever the superior court thinks. I have no idea what the superior court thinks, but that's an issue.

Okay. You also have to pass the insolvency test, which is harder in an involuntary because there's two parts. It's also potentially harder because of the issues that have been raised in the Mexican proceeding that -- involving the acceleration notices possibly, but it also may be that simply the test can't be met because the company isn't doing that badly. I have no idea. No one has any idea sitting here today for sure. So then that isn't really an option if you can't meet the insolvency test. And so you're telling me that that's the best other option for the other parties,

and I'm not really sure that's the best other option.

Then the other argument that you all are making to me is that, okay, they should just get their judgment in front of Judge Gardephe, which believe me, I know Judge Gardephe. He is not a person to sit on things. And one of the things that Ms. Cornish said is right. I think that if he knows there is a fire that needs to get done, he actually does do that. He's one of the district court judges that actually moves reasonably fast. And I know this from experience.

So he rules. He -- there's a judgment, but we heard the testimony about the judgment enforcement process in Mexico, which is obviously not short either. It's a few years, etcetera. In the meantime, no disrespect, you have notes that are maturing next year, okay? The fact that somebody is going to sit here today and tell me that this isn't a restructuring scenario, I just -- I'm sorry. I have a hard time buying that because, you know, we are talking about a fairly large amount of notes. We are talking about the fact that those are going to have to be dealt with, whether now or you manage to hold them all off until 2024 from this litigation.

Let's just say your litigation strategy works.

Because no offense, you have one too, and that occurs. You have maturity. They're going to be due then. So the

parties need to really be -- so your argument that they should be filing an involuntary concurso, I should be dismissing this, and there should be no restructuring going on isn't going over very well with me. And that's where my problem is. So that's going to get to some of my other questions later on.

MR. CLAREMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. So first question -- next question is are the noteholders in Diamond the only U.S.

Creditors right now where there's an argument that there's a past due amount outstanding in the United States with respect to U.S. Creditors that you're aware of. I'm not saying you agree that that's true.

MR. CLAREMAN: Yeah. So why don't I start with the last question if I may? So the last question that you asked about whether there's any U.S. creditors that we're aware of, Diamond has a disputed claim. I wouldn't describe Diamond as a U.S. creditor. I think it's a Dutch entity. They have a contingent litigation claim that is in state court. I'm aware of a litigation claim that's been pending for a very long time brought by a Mexican singer that is pending in Texas. Again, there's a contingent litigation claim.

There is -- there has been brought to our attention that there are claims, I think it's approximately

Page 61 1 \$20,000 or less that have been asserted by a tax authority 2 in California. We believe that those taxes are -- not 3 agreed that they're due. We believe that they're associated 4 with properties that were sold. That is what we are aware 5 of. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. CLAREMAN: Shall I move to the other questions 8 that Your Honor --9 THE COURT: Yes. 10 MR. CLAREMAN: Okay. So I'll address the question 11 about the prospects of a Chapter 11 case here. Certainly 12 the origins of this case, not only are they involuntary, 13 there's clearly a lot of dispute and litigation between the 14 parties. It is --15 THE COURT: Which just makes me feel like I should 16 send you all to mediation. How do you feel about that? 17 MR. CLAREMAN: Well, I -- Your Honor, I'd need to 18 -- I would need to discuss that with my co-counsel, with the 19 client, but we believe fundamentally that these claims 20 should be dismissed. That is what we're arguing here, so 21 I'm sorry to not answer. 22 THE COURT: I understand. I get that. But -- I 23 get that, and I understand that. And if the parties don't feel like they want to sit down and have a conversation with 24 25 each other, that's fine. We'll go forward with litigation.

I'll rule. Don't worry. But my point to you is that sooner or later, people are going to have to try to resolve these issues. And whether you're arguing with me, you know, you're making the argument to me that this shouldn't be done through a collective proceeding, it doesn't need to be done through a collective proceeding, well, probably every prepack on earth with like no holder issues either end up as an out-of-court, end up with a pre-pack.

We have a lot of issues where people just have proceedings that deal with the notes and nothing else in a proceeding. Everything else leaves -- gets untouched.

Otherwise, we would never have pre-packs. So there are processes we have here to deal with that, and that's I'm sure true in Mexico also because the Mexican experts both talked about pre-packed concursos. So I'm not saying the U.S. is the only way to do that.

But there obviously are insolvency proceedings that go on that don't reorganize the entire company or don't affect everybody and are very limited as to who is being affected in it. We have it here, and apparently they have it there. And there's reasons for that because you have to figure out sometimes how you're going to deal with the fact that we have noteholders who all are -- you know, who are, you know, all over the world, and you have to consents from them, and you need a certain amount. Not always so easy to

do without everybody consenting.

And also, that sometimes you only need to restructure your funded debt. And even here, maybe not even all your funded debt because obviously it doesn't seem like you have issues with your bank facility. Anyway, I just -- I'm having a hard time accepting the argument that this isn't a situation where the parties really need to be dealing with the ultimate issue, which is what are you doing with this. You know, you can litigate all you want. At the end of the day, there's going to be some kind of judgment here.

Whether it's just a judgment on the interest and the principal, or it's a judgment on the redemption, that's where you're headed with Judge Gardephe. Just leaving that aside for the moment, what does that take you to? I mean, the parties have to eventually get somewhere on this.

Unless the company really has a check right now that they could write to them or they're planning on writing to them when they -- when maturity happens, which I don't really think is the issue based on the declarations that were submitted.

So I'm having a hard time understanding the resistance to the fact that there needs to be some kind of restructuring here, whether it happens here or in Mexico.

And you guys haven't -- the Debtors, alleged Debtors,

Page 64 1 haven't filed concursos either. So you obviously haven't 2 gotten to the point where you're prepared to submit yourself 3 to that. That's correct. So to answer Your MR. CLAREMAN: 5 Honor's question about mediation, we would agree to a 6 mediation if that was -- if that -- if the Court felt that that was appropriate or helpful under the circumstances. 7 -- but returning to the prospects in the absence of a 8 9 mediating agreed outcome, which would --10 THE COURT: Mm-hmm. 11 MR. CLAREMAN: -- necessarily need to involve a 12 lot of parties given the Mexican law issues and would not be 13 a simple matter, ultimately, in the cases that have pursued restructuring in the U.S., the four cases that managed to 14 15 have restructurings here successfully, and I'm, you know, 16 not a Mexican lawyer, but pre-packs in Mexico I presume are 17 the same way, that there needs to be broad consensus in 18 order for them to work. And so from the standpoint of 19 today, in the absence of a mediation, I'm just talking about 20 if we --THE COURT: Mm-hmm. 21 22 MR. CLAREMAN: -- proceed, and if the motions were 23 denied, we would be in a situation of uncertainty starting 24 from the standpoint of a litigious posture with the

noteholders, because that is where the posture is today.

There are other parties in Mexico whose interests are unlikely to align with -- and clearly I think don't align with the noteholders. I'm talking about equity. It is a majority controlled company. So I think that launching into a Chapter 11 case with an uncertain outcome and no basis today to believe it would be successful ultimately runs into all of the problems that I was describing.

Because ultimately, you can have the Chapter 11 process. It would, I think we can all agree, would likely be expensive and time-consuming in the absence of a rapid agreement. And then you would have all the problems associated with needing to go back to Mexico for enforcement if not -- if all of the stakeholders were not in agreement. And there are a significant number of other stakeholders that have rights that may be implicated by whatever happens here.

THE COURT: Understood. Since the filing of the petitions by the petitioning Creditors -- I'm asking this for a reason. The record requires it actually for the abstention cases, have any restructuring negotiations taken place?

MR. CLAREMAN: Since the filing of the petitions?

No. There were discussions prior to the filing of the petitions at various points in time. That has been referenced I think in some of the briefing that's been

Page 66 1 filed. 2 THE COURT: Right, but that they were 3 unsuccessful. MR. CLAREMAN: Correct. 4 5 THE COURT: And I know the cases seem to point to, 6 on abstention, some of the things that they look at are 7 whether or not there's another remedy that's out there 8 that's imminent. I mean, the case you cited to that I 9 believe was Judge Bernstein's case, the -- you know, there's 10 -- oh, actually, no, Judge Gropper's case, there's 11 definitely issues about whether or not there's another 12 proceeding that's out there and whether or not there's 13 options available. And some of the things that they look at 14 is whether or not there is out-of-court restructuring 15 discussions going on, other types of negotiations, or input 16 somewhere else. So we don't have another in-court 17 proceeding --18 MR. CLAREMAN: Right. 19 THE COURT: -- that which we know about --20 MR. CLAREMAN: Right. 21 THE COURT: -- that's an insolvency proceeding 22 anyway. A restructuring proceeding. Okay. Do the alleged 23 Debtors have sufficient cash on hand today to repay the 24 notes? 25 MR. CLAREMAN: I have -- I'm not in the position

to answer that question.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. You've answered my question there. What is the case law support that you have for informed non-convenience as a separate legal basis for a dismissal on the 11 case? Other than is that court case, which was a 7, and I think one other case. I haven't really found any cases about that in the context of 11. And in fact, in our district, there had been some cases that say that that's not something that should be permitted. And Judge Drain in the Kerwin case, for example, basically said that he didn't believe that that is even an argument in connection with this as a separate argument.

It's obviously part of the analysis you do under 305, but he was talking about it as a separate defense or basis for dismissal. And I think the reason that he felt that is that, while that's an argument sometimes for a specific dispute between parties in an adversary proceeding, and certainly there are cases that use it as a basis for dismissal in an adversary proceeding, it's not something for a -- what I would describe as a fulsome, overall restructuring, you know, process. And that there hasn't been anything in our circuit that supports that. Do you have any cases that support that that you could cite me to?

MR. CLAREMAN: Other than Jacor, no.

THE COURT: Okay. Fine. With respect to your

Page 68 Multicanal I guess discussions, my understanding about that case, and I might be wrong, was, wasn't there an Argentinian proceeding pending? MR. CLAREMAN: There was, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. CLAREMAN: You're correct. And if I may address that with a little --THE COURT: Sure. MR. CLAREMAN: -- some light connection, so there -- in Multicanal, yes, there was an Argentine proceeding pending. And I believe that there was a similar set of circumstances (indiscernible). But the -- so then there's not a foreign pending proceeding here, at least a foreign restructuring proceeding. And so that is -- that obviously the case here, but what we are saying the experts ultimately agreed to is there will need to be a foreign proceeding. So there is not one pending now, but there is only -- there needs to be. And the only court that actually can effectuate a restructuring ultimately given the effect of 293, given the effect of the establishment in Mexico and the agreement on that point, there would ultimately need to be a second proceeding. And so there is not one today, but the text of Section 305(a)(1) does not require there to be a pending

proceeding in order for a dismissal to be appropriate.

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THE COURT: Okay. And I think these are probably, sorry, questions for Ms. Cornish, so I apologize for this.

So the argument that you are making about Murray in the Second Circuit decision, obviously I've read the cases, so one of the things I think that the court looked at there, at least my reading of it, is first the fact that they were really using it as judgment enforcement. We don't have a judgment here.

MS. CORNISH: Correct.

THE COURT: So we're not -- this is not yet judgment enforcement. If --

MS. CORNISH: Right.

THE COURT: -- you guys come back, if I dismissed it and it went to Judge Gardephe, for example, and then you got the judgment and then it came back again, maybe not even to me, some -- maybe to somebody else, then I could see that argument being made. But here today, that's not what we have before me. And then the argument that you made about an adequate remedy outside of the bankruptcy process, again, I'm having a hard time accepting that. And it's not because I don't think it's impossible for somebody to just get a judgment on the notes, go to Judge Gardephe, get a judgment on the notes, and then go try to collect on that in Mexico, that certainly is possible.

And it -- I think the testimony from both of the

Page 70 1 experts is that it would take a couple of years. You know, 2 at least a year and eight months I think was the shortest we 3 got out of anybody. So a little while, but it was -- would be possible potentially to collect on it. But is there 4 5 anything else you're pointing to that's an adequate remedy 6 for the parties? 7 MS. CORNISH: Yeah. I mean, look, it obviously wasn't at issue in Murray, and this case is a very unusual 8 9 situation. 10 THE COURT: True. 11 MS. CORNISH: But we think there are two possible 12 paths here going back to Judge Gardephe, getting a judgment, 13 and seeking to enforce that judgment. Or going down to 14 Mexico and instituting an involuntary concurso. And you 15 know, the abstention argument is if that's the path, if the 16 path is a concurso, starting here and going through the 17 whole process here makes no sense. Because for all the 18 reasons I'm not going to, you know, repeat the arguments, 19 and that's why we're arguing for abstention with respect to 20 that other alternative path. 21 THE COURT: Right. 22 MS. CORNISH: So I --23 THE COURT: But you're not -- your clients aren't 24 willing to avail themselves of the Mexican courts. And as

you know, the insolvency test is much harder in an

involuntary than it is an involuntary because you have to meet two parts of that test. And I'll just say for whatever it's worth, probably everyone -- most people in this court anyway I know who knew me before know, look, I looked at the financial information that I have, which is not great. It's not detailed enough to figure out the answer to this question, and I'm certainly not a visitador. But I'll just say I can't figure out for certain that today you would meet both of the insolvency tests, and that's even if I assume that the petitioning Creditors win on every one of their arguments before Judge Gardephe, which I'm not saying will happen.

But I'm just saying that I can't figure out that that's a certainty. And that's leaving aside the fact that they might get enjoined from doing it. Again, I'm not arguing that the experts -- that anyone's expert is wrong or right. I think it's just very uncertain because they could still be subject to somebody arguing that it violates the superior court. Maybe you would never argue that. Maybe they would never argue it. Maybe it would never come up.

But if it did, it might be that you can't even commence the action right now. Maybe that could change in the future. I get that because those injunctions could go away potentially. But I'm just saying to you right now I'm not sure you could do that without a risk.

MS. CORNISH: Understood that there are risks, and they've been identified. But I guess the point is nobody's tried at this point. And we have the testimony of Mr. Mejan that he does not -- and I understand that's maybe cold comfort, but there is that testimony. But nobody's tried.

And -
THE COURT: I understand.

MS. CORNISH: -- the insolvent -- the issue of satisfying the insolvency test, that's -- I don't think that goes away because you're going to have to go back down to Mexico anyway.

THE COURT: It doesn't go away, but it goes away depending on the circumstances that you're in. I really appreciate the arguments of people are making, but in my world, I see a lot more restructuring opportunities than you all do I guess. Because I'm -- and you know, maybe it's just that I'm not in the middle of the fighting with the parties, and you know, that's just not my perspective. But I understand of course sometimes people reach out-of-court restructuring. If people were talking, maybe that could happen. Maybe it won't. Don't know, okay?

MS. CORNISH: Yeah.

THE COURT: Then there's -- in Mexico there's a voluntary concurso. I assume that if this manages to go on until there's a maturity, there might not be a lot of issues

about it. There might have to be a voluntary concurso at some point. There might not. I don't know. But that's one option. The Debtors certainly allege Debtors have that option, and they will have an easier time meeting the insolvency test right now because only one part -- or in the future because only part is necessary.

Then you have the involuntary concurso. Okay.

Someone has to decide they're not going to take any risks on the injunction issue, and they have to meet both parts of the insolvency test, also part. Or we have Chapter 11. It has happened. People have used Chapter 11 to restructure major Mexican corporations before. Generally, voluntarily. I grant you this is a unique one here, but it is a possibility. It's a way to restructure whether it's now or in the future, that's all I'm saying to you.

So I think personally just sitting here as a court, I see a lot more opportunities that may or may not involve having to go back for a concurso in the future.

Even if I dismissed these cases now, at some point, unless the parties reach an agreement, which they're not going to do if they don't talk, we're going to -- you're going to be at a point where there'll have to be something that happens. And I don't think -- you know, I'm not sure the fact that they could something and they chose to do something else means that it's inevitable that it will have to go back to

the Mexican court.

It would if you all don't reach an agreement.

That's true. But that's within people's purview, both sides. Not just one. I've been berating the Debtors.

Trust me, I'll be berating -- alleged Debtors. I'll be berating the other side too about this. So --

MS. CORNISH: Your Honor, we don't feel berated.

You're entitled to all of your questions. I do want to make one note. I have consulted with Mr. Cohen with respect to your question to Mr. Clareman as to, you know, what would happen, how would our -- what would our client do if these cases went forward and your -- all of your comments about the prospects of a consensual situation, a pre-pack.

I understand that sometimes one (indiscernible) notes gets restructured through a pre-pack, and that is in a sense a reorganization. It's not a reorganization of the whole company, but it is. All we can say about that right now is that the parties have been obviously in litigation for quite some time. They haven't had negotiations for some time. And we have no reason to believe at this point in time that TV Azteca is going to participate here in a consensual proceeding. We have no basis to make that representation to Your Honor.

THE COURT: I understand. Okay. That -- I mean, that's sufficient. I understand you can only tell me what

Page 75 1 you can tell me. 2 MS. CORNISH: Yeah. THE COURT: And I relate that. 3 MS. CORNISH: Yeah. And I -- you know, if past is 4 5 prologue, there is certainly a real possibility that this 6 would not be a cooperative proceeding. 7 THE COURT: Okay. And I guess I'm really trying 8 to have a -- trying to figure out for me, again, this is 9 just for me because I think you all know I'm not -- I'm -- I don't share card work, but this is not going to be an easy 10 11 decision. But my point to you is I'm happy to just go ahead 12 and render my decision here at some point at the end of --13 you know, after I've reviewed the transcript and everything else and I write a decision. Because I know this will be 14 15 going up on appeal. No disrespect to anybody. 16 So that's okay. That's what happens in these 17 I've learned over the years not surprisingly. But I 18 think what I would -- what I'm trying to decide on my side 19 is, you know, is that really the best course here, or 20 letting the parties talk first the best course here. That's 21 why I asked my question. 22 MS. CORNISH: Yeah. Understood. And I think Mr. 23 Clareman made clear that Your Honor mentioned mediation. I 24 think we can pretty confidently say that we would 25 participate in that. We haven't had our clients actually

Pg 76 of 169 Page 76 1 tell us that, but if that's what Your Honor's referring to. 2 THE COURT: Yeah. I'm thinking about it because honestly just sitting here listening to a day's worth of 3 4 testimony, and obviously I've read all the papers before, 5 and I've read everyone's cases, and everything else before I took the bench for sure yesterday, I -- you know, I just --7 I feel like I could rule and send you guys back to three 8 years of litigation minimum. Maybe. Maybe a little 9 Who knows? And I'm not sure that would be a shorter. 10 helpful thing. Or we could have a lot of litigation before 11 me if I kept it. I'm not sure that's the best course 12 either. 13 So I feel like I'm trying to see if there's a 14 better course here than my just deciding this. Not because 15 I don't want to decide it. I'm happy to decide things. 16 That's what my job is. But because I'm not sure it's the 17 best result for the parties given where things are. So I 18 just note that for whatever it's worth. All right. Well, 19 we can talk about that again after we finish closing 20 arguments and everything like that about that. But I thank 21 you for answering my questions. 22 MS. CORNISH: Okay. Thank you. 23 THE COURT: That's all my questions.

- 24 MS. CORNISH: Thank you, Your Honor.
- THE COURT: All right. Okay. Mr. Qureshi, you're 25

Page 77 1 up. 2 MR. QURESHI: Thank you, Your Honor. And I don't even know whose this is. 3 MS. CORNISH: I'll grab the 101. 4 MR. QURESHI: 5 MS. CORNISH: I don't know whose this is. 6 MR. QURESHI: Your Honor, good afternoon. For the 7 record, Abid Qureshi, Akin Gump on behalf of the petitioning 8 Creditors. Your Honor, before I hand up my dec, if I could just address a couple of the questions that the Court just 9 10 asked of the Debtors. 11 THE COURT: Mm-hmm. The alleged Debtors. 12 MR. QURESHI: I'm sorry. The alleged Debtors. 13 Your Honor, let me start with why is the Debtor making one 14 argument in Mexico and another one in the United States. 15 And all I want to --16 THE COURT: Are you clairvoyant? 17 MR. QURESHI: I'm sorry? 18 THE COURT: I said are you clairvoyant? How are you going to answer that one? 19 20 MR. OURESHI: I am not other than to tell Your 21 Honor that at the time that we briefed the issues before 22 Judge Gardephe, we, the indenture Trustee in that case, did 23 not know of the existence of the injunctions because they 24 had been received on an ex parte basis and not yet served on 25 They clearly did know. the indenture Trustee.

Your Honor, with respect to the Court's question of well, where does this take us? What do we now? Well, Your Honor, first off, the debt has matured because it has been accelerated. So it's not 2024. It's matured.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll accept your statement there for your purposes because it certainly was your argument in front of Judge Gardephe. Of course I have my own opinions, but I'm just saying to you there -- certainly that's not all that's been argued in Mexican court anyway.

MR. QURESHI: Fair enough. That is absolutely true. Your Honor, we are all in favor of mediation, but under the right circumstances. And we think the right circumstances are that in order for relief be entered first and then mediation take place. And the reason for that, Your Honor, is we truly don't know what's going on because of the injunctions that they have received that prohibit the publication of any financial information.

Our concern absolutely is that assets are being removed from this jurisdiction. One hundred percent we believe that that is taking place, and that is a concern that we have. And in fact, Your Honor, we believe that that explains the conduct. What these Debtors are saying to Your Honor is rather remarkable. They are saying we will not cooperate with the federal bankruptcy court that has jurisdiction. Think about that, Your Honor.

Now, why would they make that statement? Because their strategy is not to restructure our debt. It's to avoid it completely. As I noted, Your Honor, in the timeline in opening statement --

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MR. QURESHI: -- that we know very little about the financial situation, but we know this. There was more than enough money to make the coupon payment in February of '21 and also in August of '21, and maybe even after that. How do we know? Because they voluntarily redeemed a total of \$221 million in the local Mexican Sabora Stat. They made a choice. They said we're going to pay our Mexican Creditors and we're going to avoid our U.S. Creditors.

Now, why would they do that? Well, it certainly is a set of circumstances that gave rise to our concern that while all of this was going on, assets have been leaving the U.S. jurisdiction. We can't prove it. We have no information. So Your Honor, certainly we think that the best course, the most practical course to actually make some progress given our experience with these Debtors, I think the only way, and in light of the statement Your Honor just heard about their refusal to cooperate, the only way that they will be a serious and good faith participant in a mediation is if this court takes jurisdiction over these cases and doesn't dismiss it.

And Your Honor, and I'll get to this in greater detail during my argument, but the idea that these Debtors can stand before Your Honor and say we have no reason to believe that TV Azteca will ever cooperate with this court, and at the same time argue that Your Honor ought to abstain from exercising jurisdiction, I'm sorry, Your Honor, it's absurd. And there's no legal basis for it. It cannot be the case that that kind of bad conduct is used to reward the Debtor to give them what they are asking for, which is a dismissal of these cases.

So Your Honor, if I could hand up a dec that I plan to use for argument.

THE COURT: Sure. Thank you.

MR. QURESHI: So Your Honor, if I could start by just giving the Court a bit of a preview of how I plan to proceed through argument, first I'll talk about the burden of the Debtors' there in this proceeding. Second, I'll address why they failed to meet their burden in demonstrating that this is just a two-party dispute that should be dismissed under 1112. Third, I will talk about the abstention argument. And in connection with the abstention argument, I will return to what Your Honor asked about, which is Chapter 11 scenarios, what might happen in this case.

Fourth, I'll address the conflicting expert

testimony that Your Honor has heard on the Mexican concurso procedures. Fifth, I will talk, and I'll keep it brief, about forum non-convenience. And sixth, the injunctions.

And I plan to conclude, Your Honor, with what I discussed yesterday at opening, which is the Globopar case. So turning to the petition itself, if I could ask Your Honor to turn to the first slide.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. QURESHI: Your Honor, the petitions that have been filed to commence these involuntary proceedings, they satisfy the requirements of Section 303 of the (indiscernible). So there are four. There is one that is in dispute, and that is the one that I'm going to address, and that is that the claim is subject to a bona fide A dispute. But first, Your Honor, I would like to turn -- and this on the next slide, to the petition itself. And there are of course a lot of them. And we have excerpted from just one here. And this shows what it is, that the petitioning Creditors are Claimant. And the petitions are all the same.

What it says is that -- oh, I'm sorry, Your Honor. Slide 2 is the stipulated facts. And Your Honor asked about this too. What is their position? Well, clearly different positions depending on the day and depending on the court. In this court, they have taken the position that the

principal and interest is due and owing. So that's all we can say.

Your Honor, I'm sorry. The next slide is Slide 3, and that is the petition. And what that shows is that the claim that is being filed as the basis for this involuntary petition is for principal and interest. And we also extracted on this slide, Your Honor, a footnote from our opposition brief. If it weren't clear enough from the petitions themselves, which make no claim to any kind of a premium, a redemption premium, another premium, or a premium, if any, it is only requesting principal and interest.

The footnote says, to be clear, the petitioning

Creditors are not seeking to collect the redemption premium

in these Chapter 11 cases. So let's turn, Your Honor, to

Ms. Cornish's silver bullet. That gun, from my perspective,

Your Honor, fired a blank, not a silver bullet. And the

reason is the litigation before Judge Gardephe, Your Honor,

the parties to that litigation are the indenture Trustee and

TV Azteca. The petitioning Creditors are not a party to

that dispute.

Now, Ms. Cornish says, wow, the petitioning

Creditors directed the Trustee, and the petitioning

Creditors were behind it. Your Honor, the petitioning

Creditors on their own don't hold enough notes to direct the

indenture Trustee. So what Ms. Cornish is asking Your Honor to do is to impute into our involuntary bankruptcy petitions an issue that another party chose to litigate in the other case. And what we have done in these petitions is to make as clear as we possibly could in the petitions itself that we are not claiming a redemption premium. And then to say it again in our brief that we are not seeking a redemption premium.

Mr. Cornish talked about a case -- and I think I have a note somewhere -- oh, the Mountain Dairies case. And in the Mountain Dairies case, Judge Morris, when dismissing that involuntary petition, said that essentially, she's not going to be duped into a situation where the creditor says there's no dispute for purposes of commencing an involuntary, and then come back and ask the Court to resolve at a later stage a number of disputes.

I know Ms. Cornish did not mean to suggest, Your Honor, that we, on behalf of the petitioning creditors, would ever come back to this Court and start arguing for a redemption premium after the statements in our petition, in our brief, and by me on behalf of our clients here today.

So, next, Your Honor, I would like to turn -- and this is on the next slide in the book, which is Slide 5. I apologize, Your Honor. It's Slide 4 and 5. So, what we have done on 4 and 5 is we have listed the cases that are

cited in the Debtors' brief that purportedly support the proposition that there is a -- that when there is a bona fide dispute, the case should be dismissed and you can't somehow abandon the disputed portion of the claim.

Your Honor, what makes every single one of these cases relevant is that in each one the dispute concerned a claim that was part of the petition, quite logically so.

Here, the claim that Ms. Cornish spent so much time talking about is not part of the petition. It's in a different litigation between different parties in a different court.

So, there is no silver bullet, Your Honor.

Now on to the two-party dispute. So, Ms. Cornish directed the Court to Section 1112 and case law thereunder for the proposition that if it's a two-party dispute, the case needs to be dismissed. And again, it's their burden to establish that dismissal is appropriate.

So, the first thing I wanted to do, Your Honor, is to talk about, again, what would happen in this respect if an order for relief were to be entered. Well, eventually, whether we have a cooperative Debtor or not, there would be a claims bar date. And when that claims bar date comes, the indenture trustee would know that, file a proof of claim on behalf of all the beneficial holders of the notes. And whatever other creditors might show up would know of that bar date as well.

And each holder of the notes is a unique creditor.

Each holder would be entitled to vote on a Chapter 11 plan and participate in the process. We have no idea, Your Honor, we the petitioning creditors, of how many beneficial holders of the notes might be out there. We certainly know that it's more than three.

In fact, Your Honor, there is some record evidence that there are approximately 30 holders of the notes. How do we know? Because TV Azteca sued them in Mexico. Those are the number of parties that are named in the proceedings in which they got injunctions. So we know at least that there are a lot of noteholders who no doubt would want to be repaid and would have the right to participate in this proceeding.

If Your Honor could next turn to Slide 6. And Slide 6 addresses Diamond. So, how do we know that this isn't a two-party dispute? Well, there's Diamond. How do we know that Diamond is a creditor? Because they say so, Judge. This is a quote from their response and a reservation of rights that they filed before Your Honor. Paragraph 7. Paragraph 7. "Diamond is a creditor of the bankruptcy estates of the alleged debtors in an amount not less than the \$25 million arising from a judgment that they have."

So, it's undisputed that this is not a two-party

dispute. It isn't a two-party dispute, even if it were just the notes. And there's more than that. There is at least Diamond. And Your Honor, the idea that somehow Diamond doesn't count because they didn't stand up before Your Honor and say, we support the involuntary petition, is neither here nor there. There's no obligation -- there's no case law under 1112 that says, well, you're only creditor in an involuntary petition if you stand up and support the involuntary. They're a creditor.

Their lack of participation in this proceeding -and I would note that their counsel has been here every day,
has participated in the depositions, has had access to
discovery, so to say they're not participating isn't quite
accurate either -- but the fact that they have taken no
position is neither here nor there. It is entirely
irrelevant.

Your Honor, on to the next slide, which is -- was referenced by Mr. Clareman when Your Honor asked are their other creditors. These are the tax liens from the LA County Tax Assessor's Office. There are four of them. They are in the record. JX-389, 390, 391 and 392.

Now, in aggregate amount, Mr. Clareman is right, it's only about \$20,000. But show we the provision in the Bankruptcy Code that says you don't count as a creditor unless you have a huge claim. They are a creditor. That is

the record before Your Honor.

So, Your Honor, I won't spend any more time on that argument. It clearly must fail on the record before the Court.

Your Honor, if I could next turn to abstention.

And if I could direct the Court, please, to Slide 8. And first, Your Honor, under Section 305(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a court may dismiss a case if the interests of both creditors and a debtor would be better served by such dismissal. On this slide, we have extracted a couple of cases that talk about the burden.

First of all, it clearly rests on the party seeking abstention, which is, of course, the alleged debtors. Secondly -- and this comes from what I concede is my favorite case, Your Honor, Globopar -- where the court said abstention is an "extraordinary remedy." And the court also emphasized in (indiscernible) that both creditors and debtors must benefit from dismissal. It's not a balancing test. It's not, is one party hurt or does one party gain more than the other. It's look at both and see what happens.

On this record, Your Honor, this is an utterly impossible burden for the Debtors to comply with, particularly in light of what Ms. Cornish has told the Court today, that they're not going to cooperate. Or to be

accurate, that there is no reason to believe that they will cooperate.

Your Honor, so let's turn, if we could, to Slide

9. I put this here now -- I'll come back to it, Your Honor,
but these are the factors. There's seven of them. And
after I review the record, I will come back to it one at a
time.

Before then, I now want to turn to what happened in these Chapter 11 cases. And so, let's talk about that at Slide 10. And Your Honor asked the question. There are two alternatives, and I have coined them good debtor or bad debtor. Ms. Cornish answered the question. I didn't know - I now know -- it's bad debtor. But let's look at what would happen if we had a good debtor.

Well, what would a good debtor do? A good debtor would marshal assets, ultimately would arrange for DIP financing, if that was required. Take advantage of all of the tools that Chapter 11 has to see if there are any contracts or leases or other parts of the business that could benefit from restructuring. Negotiate with stakeholders. How about that? Ultimately propose a plan of reorganization. Prosecute and confirm that that plan in accordance with -- wait for it -- their fiduciary duties because they have even in Mexico. Try to maximize value for the benefit of all creditors. It's simple.

How do we know it works, Your Honor, for a Mexican company? Slide 11 -- and Your Honor brought this up -Aeroméxico, Satmex, Posadas, Maxcom, all cases of companies that were unquestionably primarily Mexican companies.

Whether we want to say COMI in Mexico or not, I'm fine with that. These are Mexican companies. And they all restructured successfully in Chapter 11, And in all cases it was voluntary. Good debtor. It's possible they are choosing not to.

They are choosing to be bad debtor. That's on the next slide, Your Honor, Slide 12. So what does the bad debtor do? Well, actually the bad debtor is worse than what I envisioned when putting this slide together. So bad

By the way, just as an aside on the injunctions,
Your Honor may recall in the supplemental declaration that
was put in, they actually have a brief due tomorrow in
Mexico on the appeal from the injunction. I was expecting
good debtor to show up and say, Judge, we're letting you
know we're going to withdraw that injunction because COVID
is over. I was wrong. Bad debtor. They're going to keep
those injunctions in place, it appears.

debtor maintains the injunctions that preclude payment of

They're going to force creditors to use the tools that are available to Chapter 11 to conduct an

the noteholders.

investigation, figure out what assets they have. Have they been spiriting assets out of the United States? What is their liquidity like? What capacity do they have to pay? We have no idea, because there are injunctions that prevent us from accessing that information. Creditors might need to propose a DIP facility to pay for the cases.

Ultimately, if they're not going to participate, creditors might have to terminate exclusivity and propose a plan. Not might; we would have to do that. Might a Chapter 11 trustee be necessary? Certainly. That's a possibility.

Your Honor, and not to hide from the fact that in the bad debtor scenario, there absolutely could be follow-on litigation in Mexico. Nobody is suggesting that the bad debtor scenario would be easy. The whole point of the bad debtor scenario, which again is what they have said they want to do, is to make it as difficult as possible. But that can't be a reason to dismiss the cases, Your Honor. That would make no sense. Not supported by the law and fundamentally inequitable.

So now, Your Honor, I would like to turn to the experts and their divergent opinions. So these are the ones that I will cover. And to be clear, Your Honor, there are more than just these that the experts disagree on. Is an involuntary Chapter 11 ever capable of being recognized in Mexico? Professor Mejan says no; Mr. Guerra says yes.

Second issue. Can a concurso court determine that the Debtors, all 35 of them, have a COMI in the United States. Again Professor Marjan says, no; Mr. Guerra says, yes. Do the Debtors have an establishment in the United States? They disagree on that too. And then finally is an involuntary Chapter 11 plan ever capable of being enforced, as distinct from recognized in Mexico?

So those are the issues that I will cover. Let's start, Your Honor, if we could, with recognition of an involuntary. And this is on Slide 14. So, Your Honor will recall that on cross-examination, I took Professor Mejan through Article 296, and he agreed with me that Article 296 is mandatory. It uses the word "shall". It is not permissive; it is mandatory.

He further agreed with me that in these involuntary Chapter 11 cases, a foreign representative would be able to comply with the four subsections that are identified in Article 296. Having also agreed that the language is mandatory, what would then follow if one is guided by the statute is recognition of either a foreign main or a foreign non-main proceeding.

Now, Professor Mejan did attempt to walk back a little bit his opinion, and just how firmly he believed or under what circumstances he believed an involuntary was incapable of recognition. And so he needed to be impeached,

which by the way, happened several times.

And as a result of that, on the next slide, Your
Honor, is the portion of his deposition testimony that is
part of the record. And he was very clear in his
deposition. "Is it your testimony that it is impossible for
any involuntary Chapter 11 case to be recognized under the
LCM? Answer: Yes."

So, now let's turn to COMI. And Your Honor has heard Mr. Clareman at length talk about how, in their view, it's just ridiculous, to put it bluntly, that Mr. Guerra could ever conclude that these Debtors have a COMI in the United States.

So let me start, Your Honor, with -- again, this is in the record -- COMI under the LCM, under the Mexican concurso law, is not determined in the same way that it is under Chapter 15. It is a different process. What Mr.

Guerra testified to, it flowed from his understanding of the statute and how the statute is written. And for Mr. Guerra, Your Honor, COMI is clearly not a comparative exercise.

Right? The analysis is not, in his view, compare the contacts Mexico to the contacts with the United States and decide on that basis where the COMI is.

Were that the test, there is no doubt that the COMI could not be in the United States, because unquestionably these debtors are Mexican and they have more

contacts with Mexico than with the United States. Instead, his opinion flows from the LCM. And he starts with -- he referred Your Honor to three articles, 15, 15 bis, and 17.

And under Article 15, which I have on Slide 16, what he relies on in particular is that holding companies and subsidiaries or affiliates form a business group. And this provision also says the commercial bankruptcy proceedings of business organizations that are part of the same business group shall be consolidated. And so he concludes from this language in Article 15 that the 35 Debtors constitute a business group, and therefore can be consolidated.

Your Honor, he next turns to Article 15 bis, which
I have extracted on the following slide. And in this
Article, it provides that in the case of one or more
merchants that are members of a business group that is
facing the same situation, their creditor or creditors may
claim -- may file their joint judicial declaration of
commercial bankruptcy. And the Article says the bankruptcy
shall be conducted under one proceeding.

So Mr. Guerra's testimony is that there is an established business group under Article 15 that consists of all the Debtors. And we then turned to Article 17, which is also on this page, and under Article 17, it's provides that any judge with jurisdiction where the merchant has its

domicile -- and this is the link between jurisdiction and domicile that Mr. Guerra testified to -- can oversee a bankruptcy filing.

On that basis, Mr. Guerra concluded that U.S. debtors being domiciled in the U.S. have a COMI here. It's a rebuttable presumption, but he concluded that as a result of their domicile, they have a COMI here. And he explained that on that basis, in light of these provisions of the LCM, a Mexican court could conclude that all 35 Debtors therefore have their COMI in the United States.

Now, Mr. Guerra's analysis did not stop there because he did look at the contracts that have been entered into by the U.S. Debtors, and he did examine the nature of the contacts of those U.S. Debtors to the United States. To be clear, he did not do that for all 35 Debtors, but he did for the U.S. Debtors. And he concluded that there was no evidence that he was aware of that would rebut the presumption that because of the domicile of those entities, their COMI is in the United States.

Your Honor, let me now turn to the next issue that divides the experts, which is the question of establishment.

And for that, I'd begin on Slide 18, if I may. Your Honor, on Slide 8 in the bottom right hand is an excerpt from Mr.

Mejan's report. Your Honor will recall this provision from the cross-examination, where he says, "Based on the

Rodriguez declaration, I do not believe the Debtors maintain an establishment. And at a minimum, it would be contested."

And then he goes on to say, "Because there are no offices or employees." So he acknowledges that this is a litigable issue in Mexico. Is there an establishment or not?

There was much discussion about the importance of employees and offices, of the lack thereof. I think ultimately, Your Honor, both experts acknowledge that it's a broader test. You've got to look at more than just employees and offices, although Professor Mejan doesn't say that in his report, he got there.

But then let's look at what the record says. And Your Honor, I should have said this earlier and I'll say it now, so that these decks don't go to people they shouldn't go to. Slide 19 has one piece of information that is confidential. I am not going to mention it here and this book is not going on the record. Sorry I didn't mention that earlier, but I think everybody here is covered by the protective order.

So, Your Honor, I'm going to now talk about a number of contacts with the U.S. And to be clear, on Slide 19, the blue box at the top of the page that has some numbers in it, I'm not allowed to say what those numbers are. I am allowed to say they're big. And I believe that they are.

So this page discusses the contract between a U.S. and Univision. That fact is not confidential. Mr. Mejan not only did not review this contract, he wasn't aware of it. What he was aware of was a prior contract with Univision that has expired. And if Your Honor turns the page, this is the prior contract. The prior contract ran from 2016 through 2023. And in the Rodriguez declaration, Mr. Rodriguez mentions that the value of the prior contract -- somebody will get me the number; I believe it was two hundred and fifty--some-odd-million dollars that this entity received under the old contract. Your Honor now knows the number under the new contract, which I will state on the record. Professor Mejan says, well, the old contract is irrelevant because it's expired, because it was expired as of the petition date. He's wrong, Your Honor, because establishment -- \$259 million was the value of the prior contract -- thank you.

Your Honor, Professor Mejan is wrong when he says the expired contracts are irrelevant for purposes of an establishment. Why? Because a critical element of establishment is the non-transitory nature of the economic content. So you can't ignore what happened before the petition date. He ignores it. So, what happened here? From 2016, all the way under the extended contract through 2030, this U.S. Debtor under this U.S. contract, with a U.S.

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counterparty, is going to earn hundreds of millions of dollars. That is relevant to whether there is an establishment in the United States.

Your Honor, next, Slide 21. So 21 and 22, Your Honor, contain a list of contracts. They are all in the records. We have indicated the JX number for each of them. The first chart on Page 21 indicates in force active contracts where there is a U.S. counterparty to the contract. The checkmark column -- and there is a checkmark beside seven of those contracts -- indicate that for those contracts, there was an earlier one that has since expired. And again, it demonstrates continuity. Non-transitory presence in the United States.

The next chart, Your Honor, is a list of the expired contracts. Again, so that Your Honor can see how long a business has been established in the United States, how active that business has been. And here, the column with the checkmarks, and there are six, indicates contracts that have expired but that have been renewed. Again, because we believe that is relevant for purposes of an establishment. Mr. Guerra looked at this information.

Professor Mejan did not.

Your Honor, Slide 23. Slide 23 contains signature pages from a contract with PGA, again extracted from documents that are in evidence. So, why is this here? It's

here, Your Honor, because Professor Mejan testified that it matters, in his mind, to the establishment analysis where the contracts were negotiated, where the contracts were signed. So he says it's important, but at the same time, he says he has no idea because he didn't look at the contracts. Didn't ask the question.

So we know from the record, Your Honor, at least with respect to the PGA contracts, Your Honor can see that the signatory in all of these contracts -- and there are three -- is a gentleman by the name of Horacio Medal. And at the top of the page, it indicates that he is a manager of Azteca Sports. And that excerpt is from JX-85. It's a list of directors that was produced by the Debtor. And that document produced by the Debtor says that he is a manager of that entity and that his residence is Miami, Florida. And he is a signatory on all of these contracts.

Can I represent definitively that he was in Miami when the contracts were signed? I cannot. But certainly the best evidence we have is that these contracts were executed by a manager of a U.S. Debtor, apparently not an employee according to Mr. Rodriguez, because he says there are none, but a manager, whatever that is, in Miami.

Now, Your Honor, on the next slide, Slide 24, on the right side is information that we pulled from Mr.

Medal's LinkedIn profile. It's in the record. It's JX-386

And Mr. Medal indicates here what his work experience is.

And he describes it, Your Honor can see, Azteca

International Corporation, 16 years and four months, and he gives his positions. First, the Director of Legal affairs, then a Vice President and Chief Legal Officer, and more recently -- and it does say -- then it says under Senior Vice President and Chief Legal Officer, the entity as of December of 2019, is GSI Management, USA.

And so, Your Honor also heard testimony about a services agreement. That's also extracted on this page.

And that services agreement is between GSI, so the entity that this Mr. Medal is apparently the SVP and Chief Legal Officer of, and a TV Azteca entity. And GSI, we know, is a U.S. entity. We know it has offices in Florida.

And under this agreement, we know that this U.S. entity performs legal and consulting services on behalf of the Debtor. And we know that its Chief Legal Officer was the general counsel at TV Azteca entities from 2000 until 2019, when GSI was apparently established, at which time he became the Senior Vice President and Chief Legal Officer there.

Curiously, though, Your Honor, if the Court goes back to Slide 21 for a minute -- I'm sorry -- Slide 23, the PGA contract excerpts, Mr. Medal, in 2021, is executing these contracts on behalf of Azteca Sports Rights LLC.

So you know, Mr. Rodriguez says we have no employees in the United States. We have somebody called the manager. We have this GSI entity shares an office with or has the same address as this Azteca entity. We have Mr. Medal executing contracts on behalf of a U.S. debtor. That's the record, Your Honor.

So, Your Honor, to address a few additional

contacts with the United States, if I could as the Court to turn to Slide 25, please? In the record are the number of trademarks that various Debtors hold in the United States.

Two dozen or so trademarks; more than two dozen, I believe.

On this page, what I've highlighted simply the most recent seven, because these are all trademarks that were applied for or registered in the United States in 2023. Again, not considered by the good professor.

Trademarks in the United States certainly suggests certainly suggests business activity in the United States.

Otherwise, what would be the point of trademarks? Seven of them in 2023 certainly suggests that the activity going on in the United States is not all history.

Your Honor, on Slide 26 -- and Your Honor may recall this exhibit from the cross-examination of Professor Mejan -- and as Your Honor heard and is in the record, this is a press release from January of 2023. And it is a press release between two entities. Icara, not a debtor, not

affiliated with TV Azteca, as far as we know, and TV Azteca.

So, Your Honor, doesn't have to take my word for what TV Azteca is trying to do in the United States. Take the word of Mr. Jorge Gutiérrez, the paid TV Director for TV Azteca Internacional. What does he say? He says the Azteca Now app, which is a joint product with TV Azteca, "will target a potential audience of more than 52.5 million U.S. Residents, for whom Spanish is their primary language." Not my words, Your Honor. That's the record. And again, not something Professor Mejan considered.

So, Your Honor, on to the last of the expert issues that I planned to address, which is whether an involuntary Chapter 11 plan could ever be enforced in Mexico. Now, Mr. Clareman, actually, Your Honor, did me a favor because he stated more clearly than I can why it was that I told Your Honor at opening that the Mexican issues, they don't help the Debtors with their abstention arguments at all.

What Mr. Clareman told you is that a do-over of any plan of reorganization that might ever be confirmed in this court is inevitable. So he's saying it too. Bad debtor. Because that's the only circumstance in which there needs to be a do-over in Mexico.

Now, the reasons that are offered, and that were offered by Professor Mejan, and that Your Honor heard from

Mr. Clareman about as to why a do-over would be necessary.

First, they talk about the telecoms regulator. Well, again, not an answer, Your Honor, because Aeroméxico, Satmex and Satcom -- I may have just butchered the names -- but three of those four entities at least we know are highly regulated entities. It's in the record. The experts don't disagree.

They all had regulators that have the same rights as the IFT does under the LCM, and they all managed to get their regulators onboard with implementing a Chapter 11 plan in Mexico.

Next, there was a lot of discussion about public policy and Mexican law, and how it would be impossible to enforce a Chapter 11 plan because there is no way it could ever comply with Mexican public policy. Well, again, not true. We know it's not true because it's been done in this record by at least four Mexican Debtors.

Lastly, Your Honor, I point -- and it's extracted on this Slide -- to Article 307 of the LCM. Because what it says is that a concurso court, to the extent necessary, can modify a Chapter 11 plan to comply with Mexican public policy. And Your Honor heard this from Mr. Guerra. He explained it. Well, if -- in the case of an involuntary, yes, there needs to be a concurso. But it's not a do-over because there's a plan. And what the conciliator would do in Mexico is start with that plan. Why? Because the

conciliator is trying to be efficient. The conciliator is not assuming a bad debtor.

So the conciliator would look at the Chapter 11 plan and say, does this make sense? Does it comply with Mexican law? Does it comply with Mexican public policy? If it does, maybe it makes sense to move forward with this plan? If it doesn't, maybe there are some changes that need to be made. It's not a do-over, Your Honor.

So, Your Honor, switching gears -- and I'll try to speed it up for this section -- forum non conveniens.

Again, we don't think it applies here at all. But just briefly review the standard, because I don't think it can be met, again, the Debtor bears the burden, and like with abstention, it's a heavy burden. Great weight is given to the plaintiff's choice of forum. In this circuit, three factors are considered, and they are set forth at the bottom of this slide, Your Honor. And I will move through them rather quickly.

And the first, on Slide 29, the petitioning creditor's choice of forum is entitled to substantial deference. We've quoted a couple of cases from the Second Circuit in the Southern District on this slide. That choice of forum should "rarely be disturbed. The greater the plaintiff's or the lawsuit's bona fide lawsuits connection from the United States and to the forum of choice, the more

that the considerations of convenience favor the conduct of the lawsuit in the United States, and the more difficult it will be for the defendant to dismiss on form non-grounds.

So, what do we have in this case? Well, we've got on Slide 30, Your Honor, two of the petitioning creditors with their primary place of business in the United States.

In the case of Cyrus, it's New York; in the case of Contrarian, it's Connecticut. We have the note itself.

Slide 31. As Your Honor is well aware, New York related provisions all over this indenture. Right? Notice provisions, submission to New York law, submission to the exclusive jurisdiction of New York courts, in this very borough of Manhattan.

And that, Your Honor, is not the only contract in which the Debtors have submitted to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. On Slide 32, we have a few more that are in evidence. So, Diamond -- Your Honor, this is at ECF 15; this is in their response to the automatic stay and they state in their pleading -- ah, okay, thank you -- Diamond states in their pleading that its contract with the Debtors has a New York forum selection clause.

And Your Honor, Mr. Giller saved the day again by telling me that the next two contracts are in fact confidential, so I won't talk about them, other than to say the next two contracts have New York law, in the case of

one, and in the case of the second, both a New York law provision and exclusive jurisdiction of New York courts.

So, next slide, Your Honor, 36, and I think this one should be easy. Mexico is not an adequate alternative forum. An alternative forum is adequate, according to the case law, if it permits litigation of the subject matter dispute. Your Honor, we are being pummeled by ex parte injunctions. We don't know when the next letter rogatory is going to show up with another one. The Debtors apparently don't feel the need to disclose when they have one in their back pocket that they haven't served.

But very clearly, Mexico is not an adequate forum.

And it's not enough, by the way, to satisfy their burden

under the forum non-test to simply say that there's another

forum out there in which we could litigate. That doesn't

cut it. On these facts, Mexico is certainly not an adequate

forum.

And Your Honor, apparently the strategy that TV

Azteca is taking with respect to the noteholders is not that different from what they are doing with Diamond Films. Page 34, another extract from the Diamond Films motion, or brief, I should say, in response to the lift stay motion. They say instead of appearing in New York to litigate the merits of their breach of contract case, TV Azteca has hid in Mexico and filed legal proceedings, three of them apparently, to

collaterally attack the New York judgment in Mexico. At least their strategy is consistent, Your Honor.

Now the last slide I will point Your Honor to for why -- actually, it's the second to the last -- why Mexico is not an adequate forum is Slide 35.

TV Azteca's friend, Judge -- not my words, Your

Honor -- this is from a Mexican publication called "Reforma"

-- and Your Honor can see what it says. There is a judge,

the judge that issued the COVID injunction, who apparently

is frequented by companies that are controlled by Mr.

Salinas, TV Azteca being one of them. And so that's another

reason, Your Honor, why we do not believe that Mexico is it

adequate alternative forum.

Finally, Your Honor, the existing litigation before the Southern District of New York, which again involves different parties. But this is at Slide 36, just so Your Honor -- I know the Court has read all of the pleadings, but just to refresh on the timeline. So it was removed on September the 23rd. On September the 30th, what TV Azteca did is they asked the judge, essentially, to make us go back to the beginning. We had taken advantage of the summary judgment complaint procedure.

And so, I think the right way -- that was fully briefed by October, and then in March, we commenced this proceeding. The stay kicked in. I think the right way to

Page 107 1 characterize the procedural posture of the Southern District 2 action, Your Honor, is we're not at the beginning. We're 3 before the beginning, because TV Azteca has decided to 4 litigate the question of should we be required to start 5 again and file a complaint, as opposed to just having the 6 District Court treat our summary judgment motion from the 7 state court as a summary judgment motion and respond to 8 that. So --9 THE COURT: Isn't that up to Judge Gardephe? 10 MR. QURESHI: I'm sorry? 11 THE COURT: Isn't that up to Judge Gardephe to 12 decide? He might decide that he's going to deny that 13 request and then go on to the --14 MR. QURESHI: Oh, absolutely. 15 THE COURT: -- (indiscernible) merit --16 MR. QURESHI: Absolutely --17 THE COURT: It's within his power --18 MR. QURESHI: A hundred --19 THE COURT: And there are other examples of where 20 that's actually occurred and people were not required to 21 file complaints. You know, I know in my past and probably 22 in yours you've seen it. So, it definitely does happen. 23 MR. QURESHI: Your Honor, to be clear, 100 percent 24 that is Judge Gardephe's decision. My point is TV Azteca 25 could have consented to simply proceeding on summary

judgment. Bad debtor, Your Honor. They didn't. They are looking for delay. They are trying to avoid us. That's the strategy.

MR. QURESHI: Finally, Your Honor, private and public interest factors. And this is on Slide 37. And Your Honor, this is the final factor, and again, the emphasis in considering these factors is on fair and equitable, timely and fair. We've quoted a couple of cases. I don't need to belabor the point. That clearly is not what is happening in Mexico.

So, Your Honor, now back to the injunctions. And before I proceed going through the deck, I just wanted to note, Your Honor, that Mr. Clareman accused the petitioning creditors of one thing that he is absolutely right about.

He said we have a forum preference. Guilty, Your Honor. I sure hope that's been obvious. We absolutely believe that this is the right forum. This is our preferred forum, and this is where it should be.

Now, as explained in opening yesterday, Your

Honor, the Debtors have been trying to avoid their

obligations to the noteholders since 2021. You know,

they've received multiple injunctions. And what I'm going

to focus on is what is practical import of those

injunctions.

And so, Your Honor, if we can turn to the next

slide. So, first of all, with respect to COVID injunction, Your Honor should be aware that once the WHO declared, not the extinction of COVID, which is what the injunction speaks to, but instead the end of COVID as a public health emergency, so, slightly different. But nonetheless, we were, hindsight, apparently foolishly optimistic that maybe the Debtors would take this injunction off the table.

And at the time, it was the only one that we knew about. And we wrote a letter and we said, please withdraw the injunction. Not only has the WHO said that COVID is over, but the President of Mexico, shortly after the WHO declaration, issued his own, which is also in the record, and it says the same thing, that COVID is no longer a public health emergency.

The response from the Debtor was from Paul Weiss, on behalf of the Debtor, was go talk to Mexican counsel. It will not surprise Your Honor to learn that here we are, the injunction is still in force. It has not been voluntarily withdraw.

So, Your Honor, now let's turn to the second injunction, the July 2022 injunction. And Your Honor asked both experts a number of questions about the timing of these injunctions, about their impact on acceleration, and so that's what I want to focus the Court on.

And so, with respect to this July injunction,

again, this is the one that has not been served. We don't know when it might be served, but it has not been, to our knowledge. In May of 2022, the noteholders issued an acceleration notice. Not the Trustee. Different acceleration notice.

It's clear that the July injunction was obtained in response to the noteholder acceleration notice. How do we know that? Because the July 2022 injunction refers expressly to that acceleration notice. In Paragraph 2 it's referred to as the notice of early maturity, dated May 3rd of 2022. So we know that they got this injunction expressly to extinguish any effect of the acceleration notice that was sent.

Now, if Your Honor turns to the next slide, on August the 5th, and then again on August the 8th, we have more acceleration notices. This time from the indenture trustee. So, what happened when the indenture trustee issued an acceleration notice? Well, on the very next day, on August the 9th, we now know TV Azteca got the judge to issue an extension and modification of the injunction. The indenture trustee was added as party. And the injunction now declared that the August 5th and the August 8th acceleration notices, the indenture trustee's acceleration notices, were of no effect. Right?

So, clearly, the objective -- and as with our

system, Your Honor, it's not just the injunction. It's an injunction accompanied by a complaint. Right? So there's no question at all that in Mexico, bad debtors, they're taking the position that they don't owe us anything. In this Court, they're stipulate that they owe us \$400 million and that they've missed a bunch of interest payments.

So slide 42. Your Honor asked the experts, what do these injunctions mean for the insolvency showing? If we're supposed to take solace, we the petitioning creditors, in the idea that we can go to Mexico and file an involuntary petition — they say it again and again. And Your Honor, I made this point at opening, but I'll come back to it. Let's just pause and think about the absurdity of the situation.

They are saying, oh, don't worry about it. You have a remedy. You can file an involuntary in Mexico. So, Judge, abstain from taking the case. And at the same time, they're running around in secret in Mexico to get injunctions that have to be designed to preclude exactly that. Because what the injunctions say is that there are no due obligations. None.

I think the experts were quite clear -- certainly,

Mr. Guerra was -- that again, based on the very limited

financial information that we have access to, with these

injunctions in place it would not be possible to satisfy the

insolvency test for purposes of commencing an involuntary

proceeding in Mexico.

And, Your Honor, moreover, the fact that the July injunction -- first of all, the COVID injunction does that job all on its own. So the second injunction is just an add-on. But the fact that it has not been served?

Irrelevant. Irrelevant. And the reason it's irrelevant is that that injunction finds TV Azteca from the moment that they received it.

On Slide 43, Your Honor, I just extracted the relevant excerpt from the two expert reports that deal with the injunctions and the force of those injunctions. And I think I've belabored the point enough, so I will move on.

And back, now that we have the record, to abstention. Slide 44, Your Honor, again it's a repeat of the seven factor test, this time with some colorful red Xs behind each one to denote. And I'm not sure I got the symbol right, because clearly the X is meant to denote that it is not a requirement that they meet. I probably should have put a check mark on the other side. I thought that would be confusing. But each of these factors, it actually supports our case, Your Honor.

So let's go through them. The first is economy and efficiency of administration. Well, Your Honor, no doubt in the minds of petitioning creditors that economy and efficiency of administration would best be served by these

cases remaining right here in Your Honor's courtroom.

With respect to the petitioning creditors, we are seeking to restructure the notes issued in the U.S., governed by New York law, in a court that can move expeditiously. There is no court in this country that moves as economically and efficiently as the Bankruptcy Courts.

The fact that these Debtors are Mexican Debtors, some of them, 30 -- 25, or whatever the exact number is -- 32 are foreign. That fact does not change anything about this first prong of the test, economy and efficiency of administration.

As the record demonstrates, highly regulated

Mexican companies, even ones with a COMI in the U.S., can

and have been effectively restructured in this very Court.

That, by the way, is one of few points of agreement between
the experts.

So, what the Debtors can't do, they plainly don't satisfy this factor, based on the record before the Court.

And what they can't do, Your Honor, is say, we're going to be the bad debtor and we're going to object to everything, and therefore, this proceeding is going to be really expensive and it's going to take really long. You don't get to do that. You can't satisfy a requirement like this by saying, I'm going to be a bad debtor. And that's what they're saying.

Factor 2, whether another forum is available to protect the interests of both. And I emphasize the words "both parties." Or there is already a pending proceeding in state court. So, let's go through this, Your Honor.

TV Azteca -- again, I won't belabor the injunctions -- we don't have a forum in Mexico. That has been made very clear. Because to the extent we ever had a forum in Mexico, they have taken it away from us. End of discussion, Your Honor. They have taken it away from us. Any proceeding to collect on the notes, any proceeding -- those are the words used in both injunctions -- that is what we are precluded from doing in Mexico.

Your Honor, these Debtors have made clear, both in the United States and in Mexico that they're going to do whatever they can to avoid their obligations. So Factor 2 is clearly not satisfied.

ractor 3, whether federal proceedings are necessary to reach a just and equitable solution. Sunlight, Your Honor. I talked about it at opening. We really need it. There needs to be some transparency. We know nothing. We absolutely think that a federal proceeding -- not just a federal proceeding -- this federal proceeding is necessary to reach a just and equitable resolution and a just and equitable distribution of assets.

Your Honor, without these Chapter 11 cases, the

petitioning creditors, and by the way, other creditors like
Diamond Films, for example, they would be forced to pursue
TV Azteca through piecemeal litigation, probably in multiple
jurisdictions at the same time. So this factor cannot be
satisfied.

Factor 4, whether there is an alternative means of achieving an equitable distribution of assets overlaps substantially with Factor 3. And again, the record demonstrates the opposite, Your Honor. They're doing everything they can to avoid these obligations. There is no alternative means. Your Honor asked Mr. Clareman directly, have there been any discussions since the filing of this petition to restructure out of court? No, there haven't. There haven't been any discussions for a very long time, Your Honor.

And that goes to Factor 5, whether the Debtor and the creditors are able to work out a less expensive, out of court arrangement which better serves all interests in the case. I needn't say anything further about that one, in light of their answers to your questions, Your Honor.

Factor 6, whether a non-federal insolvency has proceeded so far in those proceedings that it would be costly and time-consuming to start afresh with the federal bankruptcy process. There is no non-federal insolvency proceeding.

And so Factor 6 is not in play.

And finally, Factor 7, the purpose for which bankruptcy jurisdiction has been stopped. Your Honor, we are here in this court TV Azteca has elected, for reasons known only to TV Azteca, not to commence a concurso. They certainly could have. They certainly could have. Your Honor has asked the question, why haven't they? Unless I was out of the courtroom at the time, I haven't heard an answer. So, again, Your Honor, the purpose of this Chapter 11 proceeding is simple. A fair and equitable and a quick That's what the Bankruptcy Code does. That's what process. it's for. That's what we and other creditors need in this circumstance. So now, almost at my favorite part, which is Globo, starts at Slide 45. But before I get there, I need to digress. If I may approach, Your Honor, with some copies of the Multicanal case. Your Honor, if I could ask the Court to turn to Mr. Clareman's demonstrative book. THE COURT: Just give me a second here. MR. QURESHI: Yeah. THE COURT: Okay. What page? MR. QURESHI: 23, Your Honor. And 23 is the page of this book that describes the Multicanal case. And Your Honor already raised this issue with Mr. Clareman. Your Honor asked, didn't it involve an Argentinian proceeding?

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Page 117 1 Well, Your Honor, I just want to put a point on that. Look 2 at their slide. Their slide says the facts of Multicanal 3 are strikingly similar to those of this case. They go on to very selectively describe 90 percent of Multicanal's 4 5 operations were located in Argentina; U.S. based assets were 6 three bank accounts, aggregate balance of \$9,500. 7 They forget one thing, Your Honor. Multicanal, in 8 my parlance, that was a good debtor. This is a bad debtor. 9 It's not -- so, Your Honor, here's what they left out, and 10 this appears in --11 THE COURT: Maybe it's more accurate to say a 12 debtor that decided to try to restructure under the laws 13 that is organized under. 14 MR. QURESHI: Mm hmm. 15 THE COURT: Forget that. 16 MR. QURESHI: But my nomenclature is at least 17 short. THE COURT: It is. 18 19 MR. QURESHI: Your Honor, if I could direct the 20 Court to -- if Your Honor is looking at the page numbers on 21 the bottom right of each page, it's Page 21. 22 THE COURT: Mm hmm. MR. QURESHI: In the lefthand column there is a 23 24 paragraph that begins, "A U.S. Chapter 11 proceeding." 25 THE COURT: Okay.

1 MR. QURESHI: It's the last paragraph on the 2 lefthand column, last full paragraph. 3 THE COURT: Okay. MR. QURESHI: And it's the last two sentences that 4 5 I would like to direct the Court's attention to. The APE, 6 which is the acronym for an Argentinian insolvency 7 proceeding, the APE is far along, and with the caveats 8 previously discussed provides for the just treatment of 9 Multicanal's creditors. Given that this -- given the 10 Section 304 factors have been substantially met with regard 11 to Multicanal's APE, it is neither necessary nor practical 12 for a U.S. Chapter 11 proceeding to go forward. Well, 13 that's the bit that they left out of this case. It doesn't 14 help them at all. 15 This was a debtor that was doing the right thing, 16 negotiating with its creditors, starting a foreign 17 proceeding, proposing a plan. Not being a bad debtor, Your 18 Honor. Very misleading. 19 So, Your Honor, if we can go back to my exhibits 20 and to Page 45, where we discussed Globo? And I would like 21 for a minute to provide the Court with what I certainly 22 endeavored to be a more complete description of the relevant 23 facts in Globo. And these, I think, truly are quite similar to what we have here. 24 25 Globo was a holding company organized in Brazil.

It owned, directly or indirectly, one of the largest television production centers in the world. So it was in the same business, apparently. And its headquarters and all of its employees were located in Brazil. Its principal office and principal place of business was in Rio. In the case of Globo -- and the vast majority of its property and other holdings were located outside of the United States. A lot of similarities so far.

It had one U.S. debtor, and that debtor possessed a 30 percent interest in each of three Delaware general partnerships. Globo frequently availed itself of U.S. capital markets. Sounds a little familiar. \$750 million worth of bonds in U.S. markets. And again, like our Debtor here, subjected itself to jurisdiction.

Now, Mr. Clareman drew Your Honor's attention to the fact -- and to my surprise, they cite this this case in their briefing too -- that the judge in Globo said that Globo was actually a strong candidate for abstention.

Recall, Your Honor, the procedural posture. The District Court reversed and remanded. And when it went back to the Bankruptcy Court with instructions to develop a further factual record.

And in connection therewith, the District Court observed that on the limited factual record that was before it, it was a good candidate for abstention. Why? Well,

that's the important part. Again, Your Honor, good debtor.

Not bad debtor.

What did the good debtor do in Globo? They actively pursued, actively pursued, a consensual out of court restructuring in Brazil. What did these guys do? They actively seek ex parte injunctions to prevent a restructuring in Mexico, and certainly don't commence one on their own, much less out of court.

In Globo, the negotiations that the debtor there undertook had "borne fruit" and resulted in the formation of a steering committee of creditors. One apparently for holders of bank debt, another for holders of bond debt.

Globopar paid millions in fees to the professionals of the creditors so that they could get them in a room to negotiate a consensual restructuring. So that's why the court made the observation in Globo that it was a good candidate for abstention. This case is not. Globo doesn't help them, not one bit.

So the court in Globo -- and if I could ask Your
Honor to turn to Page 47 of the presentation -- like in this
case, in Globo the debtor did not want to be a foreign
debtor in an involuntary proceeding. We now know why it was
doing and out of court restructuring and apparently making
some progress. And what the court noted is that the
Bankruptcy Court had a "obligation" -- and it uses that

word, obligation -- to exercise its authority, even if the possibility existed that a foreign court would ignore it.

So translate that to this case, Your Honor.

Professor Mejan, he says, waste of time, Judge. Nothing you do in this involuntary proceeding is ever going to get recognized or implemented or anything else in Mexico; categorically. That's what he says.

What does the District Court of New York say?

District Court of New York, Your Honor, says that this Court has an obligation to exercise its authority to not abstain.

And by the way, this is a case where jurisdiction is agreed.

Even if -- that obligation exists, even if

Professor Mejan is right. Even if he's right. That's why I

said at opening Your Honor, it doesn't matter if they're

right. It doesn't help them. Your Honor can't abstain

under applicable law.

The court went on to explain that whether or not debtor cooperated, not relevant to the analysis. So, bad debtor? Not relevant. Actually, it's a little the opposite here, right? Bad debtor not only not relevant, but certainly can't help with meeting the abstention standard. That would make no sense. That would give parties all the wrongs incentives, Your Honor.

So, Your Honor, in Globopar -- and we're now on the last page of the presentation -- the court recognized a

number of considerations, including the lack of cooperation by the debtor in that case. Foreign creditors in Brazilian courts would be a significant impediment to the orderly administration of an involuntary case. And the court recognized the possibility that foreign creditors who are not subject to the Bankruptcy Court's -- the U.S. Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, might not cooperate. And that a Brazilian court might not compel them to participate in a U.S. proceeding. Notwithstanding these considerations, the court said that federal courts should exercise the full measure of the authority that they have.

And so Your Honor, the Court should not focus on what may or may not occur in Mexico. It just doesn't bear on the abstention analysis on the facts that are before Court in this case. And they're all in the evidentiary record.

I should add, Your Honor, that it certainly is within the authority of this Court to decide to accept some of the petitions and to dismiss others. Doesn't have to be all of them. I'm certainly not advocating for that. I think the record is applicable to all 35. Your Honor could decide to keep only the U.S. Debtors, although again, on the facts and on the evidence before the Court, I don't think that makes any sense and I don't think there is a basis to draw that distinction. Clearly, abstention is inappropriate

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So, to conclude, Your Honor, based on the evidentiary record before the Court, and based on the Debtors' consistent actions to delay and to obstruct our ability to recover on the notes, which is in a very plentiful way in the record, and based on the ex parte nature of all of the injunctions that the Debtors have received in Mexico, it would be fundamentally inconsistent with U.S. notions of due process, of fairness and of equity for these cases to be dismissed on this evidentiary record.

Your Honor, these cases cry out for U.S.

Bankruptcy Court intervention and supervision. And with
that, I'm happy to address the Court's questions.

THE COURT: Okay. Oh, my law clerk is telling me that we have to redial (indiscernible) at 4:45 PM, and so that maybe we should break now, before I start my questions, so that we can redial in.

MR. QURESHI: Sure.

THE COURT: Okay. So maybe, like, five minutes?

I don't need more than that. It takes us five minutes to dial in. Is that all right?

MR. QURESHI: Of course.

THE COURT: Do you want more time.

MR. QURESHI: No.

THE COURT: Okay.

Page 124 1 MR. QURESHI: Five minutes is certainly fine with us, Your Honor. 2 3 THE COURT: And the next --4 MAN: It takes 10 minutes to get to the restrooms. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. QURESHI: Ten minutes it is. 7 THE COURT: Okay, 10 minutes. That's fine. 8 Okay. 9 (Recess) 10 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Qureshi, one of the 11 things you mentioned I agreed with, is that, you know, if the bankruptcy proceeding continued here and I didn't 12 dismiss it that we would have a bar date and that the 13 14 indenture trustee would be filing claims on behalf of all 15 the noteholders. And that's what indenture trustees do. 16 And, in fact, the indenture here in 6.9 says that the 17 indenture trustee is going to file proof with claim. 18 So I want to understand how you square that with 19 the fact that your individual noteholders have not asserted 20 in the petitions claims for the redemption premium even 21 though the indenture trustee is seeking that on behalf of 22 all the noteholders. That's what I'm having a bit of 23 trouble for because what will happen in this case, if I did keep it, is that they will assert a proof of claim in front 24 25 of me and I don't think they're waiving their redemption

premium unless, for example, Judge Garvey denied it or something in between. But realistically, it would be asserted against me. And therefore, it is something that is in dispute between them. And your claims are based on the indenture and obviously the notices of acceleration that the indenture trustee raised, your individual claims.

And in the bankruptcy proceeding, you know, I

don't see how that isn't going to be an issue that I'll have

to decide that's being disputed in front of me or Judge

Gardephe. So please explain that to me.

MR. QURESHI: Well, certainly, Your Honor, before
Judge Gardephe, that's a separate issue from the bankruptcy.
Your Honor, the Court is right. The proof of claim would be
filed by the indenture trustee. And the simple answer, Your
Honor, is we don't know sitting here today what the proof of
claim filed by the indenture trustee would say. But what we
do know is that the petition creditors have very clearly
said that they are not pursuing that claim. And so, Your
Honor, I think the question before the Court, in the current
posture of the case is, is there a disputed claim? And the
answer is there is not. Again, there is a disputed claim
and a separate litigation which is the litigation before

THE COURT: Okay. I guess, I think you're going to -- this will be an easy question for you, I'm guessing,

which was, why haven't you all commenced an involuntary concurso proceeding? I assume it's because of the injunction?

MR. QURESHI: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I guess, I know, I know you have made what I will describe as the bad actor argument as to why I should ignore what I was told might happen in this case -- or in fairness, what I posited could happen in this case to the alleged debtors. They didn't raise this. I did. So in fairness, I shouldn't be putting it back on them -- which is if I were to deny the motion to dismiss, what happens if they don't quit their fiduciary duties? How do you envision that the cases could proceed? The only way I could see that happening is by appointing a Chapter 11 trustee in that circumstance, which probably then, that person would have to try to get access to all of the operations and control of the operations which are all in Mexico except for the ones here in the United States.

So the rest of the debtors, certainly the 25 that are located in Mexico, leaving aside for the moment TV Azteca, which clearly has some contracts here in the United States, but just going with my comment here, and some of the other entities that have so far we haven't turned up anything with the United States. I mean, they're, you know, how are, you know, do you expect the Mexican courts, they

are going to recognize my Chapter 11 trustee and let them go in and supplant the board of directors and the management of TV, TV Azteca and force them to turn over control, physical control and otherwise of the buildings and the operations of the, of the debtors to that person?

MR. QURESHI: So the realist, the realistic answer to that last question, Your Honor, is no.

THE COURT: Okay.

it's not a big assumption.

MR. QURESHI: I would not expect that that would happen. But let me answer the Court's question, what would happen? And again, what we are positing is a scenario in which after this court enters orders for relief and denies the motion to dismiss, the debtors continue to ignore the Court and continue to ignore their fiduciary duty. That's a big assumption. Maybe that will happen. If it does -
THE COURT: Well, not based on your presentation

MR. QURESHI: Certainly, certainly not because that's how they have behaved consistently, Your Honor. So what would happen? Well, the first thing I think that would happen is the noteholders would exercise some of the tools available to us under the bankruptcy code. And one of the first would be to try to find out what's there, right? We don't have financial information. We don't know what assets exist. We don't know what financial --

THE COURT: Why are you dissing and dismissing my idea about a mediation, because I really don't, when I'm sitting here today and you're making your bad debtor arguments to them. The problem is that I, I, look, I understand your client's frustration here. I get it. I've obviously expressed some of my own frustration about what's going on in Mexico and my own view about what should or should not be going on down there in those courts. So I understand your frustration. But what I think is the right answer here is at least the party should really make a good faith effort to have a discussion about what's going on and to try to see if they could negotiate a resolution.

And it's not because I'm afraid to rule on this motion. I'm not. Okay? And if you decide to me that you're not willing to go forward with mediation right now, then I am going to rule and whether you like it or not, that's where we're going to be. And -- no, let me finish. And I feel that, you know, you can paint the debtors as bad actors or potential bad actors, but they at least have said yes, I'm willing to sit down. And you know something? If you don't sit down in that circumstance, I don't know how you're going to paint them as such bad actors because at least then they're willing and open to having a conversation. And why that hasn't happened to date, I have no idea. Why they don't filed a concurso, I have no idea.

You're right. I don't know. But what it tells me is there has to be a restructuring here. I don't think you disagree with that. And the only way a restructuring happens is when usually most of the time when people talk. And if you don't talk, it's not going to happen.

MR. QURESHI: So, Your Honor, in one of our briefs that we filed before the Court, we pointed out that we had tried for months to get these debtors to engage with us in out-of-court discussions. Clearly, that didn't work. we are. What I said to the Court and what I believe is that the posture in which a mediation is likely to be most effective is first of all, one in which the Court can order it once the orders for relief are entered and the Court has the case. But secondly, Your Honor, that is now a circumstance in which I think realistically TV Azteca has no choice but to deal with the \$400 million worth of bonds. Because up until now, their entire strategy appears to have been to just ignore it entirely. So, Your Honor, while we are willing to mediate what we believe to be the case is that that mediation is only going to be effective if they are in a proceeding where they have to deal with it. Otherwise, it's going to be no different than the last two years of trying to get them to engage.

THE COURT: Except you guys haven't sat down in a room and actually had a conversation. Certainly not since

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1	you filed these proceedings before me.
2	MR. QURESHI: And not for many months before that,
3	Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: All right. Well, I understand. Okay.
5	Doesn't, I think, the LCM require a concurso proceeding in
6	order for the plan to be enforced in Mexico? I'm not saying
7	it's necessary to it. There might not be a circumstance
8	where that's required. It might be that they agree on a
9	plan. But assuming no consensuality here, because we're
10	going with your bad debtor idea, aren't, aren't you going to
11	have to have a concurso proceeding in that circumstance?
12	MR. QURESHI: So setting to the, setting to the
13	side, Mr. Guerra's testimony and his report concerning an
14	alternative procedure that exists in Mexico to enforce
15	foreign judgments, yes, through the LCM to the extent that
16	we require recognition in Mexico of a Chapter 11 plan that
17	would require the opening of the concurso proceeding.
18	THE COURT: Okay. And then when you say, "to the
19	extent you require recognition," to me that seems like where
20	you don't have a consensual restructure here under US law.
21	MR. QURESHI: Correct.
22	THE COURT: Because if it's a consensual
23	restructuring under US law, there's plenty of examples where
24	people have not had to go to the Mexican court to do that.

MR. QURESHI: Yes.

THE COURT: Maybe there's reasons to do it or not do it, but I'm just saying to you it doesn't seem to be required. We have plenty of large case examples of that.

MR. QURESHI: Right.

THE COURT: But I think everybody agrees there are consensual arrangements as long as they comply with all the Mexican laws, they involve the Mexican authorities, people are not impaired or they get proper shareholder votes, everything is done according to Mexican law that's required, that there's no need necessarily to go to concurso court.

MR. QURESHI: So, Your Honor, agree completely that in the event that we require recognition of a nonconsensual plan, there would need to be a concurso. However, I draw Your Honor's attention to Mr. Guerra's testimony and his report in which he says, so let's assume the conciliation stage in Mexico fails to reach a plan because the debtor won't consent. And in that circumstance, a liquidator is appointed and Mr. Guerra testified, and on this point, Mr. Mejan agreed that it is possible to functionally have a plan imposed by the liquidator. It doesn't have to be a sale of assets. When the liquidator is appointed, the liquidator has a duty to maximize value. In that circumstance, there would be a confirmed Chapter 11 plan that would certainly be provided to the liquidator. And the proponents of that plan would no doubt argue to the

liquidator here is a basis to reorganize and to achieve much more value than would be the case if you start auctioning off the assets of these debtors.

And in addition to that, Your Honor, in the concurso scenario -- so the hypothetical being an involuntary plan without their consent gets confirmed before Your Honor and off we go to Mexico, hard to conceive that at that point, the Mexican debtor before the Mexican court would continue to ignore the court. Hard to imagine a scenario in that circumstance where at the conciliation stage in front of a court that plainly has jurisdiction over all of its assets in Mexico, that the debtor would continue to say we're going to ignore our fiduciary duties. We're going to destroy shareholder value to the extent they're not insolvent and we're going to continue to ignore this and actually let a liquidator with statutory authority to sell its assets, go in and start auctioning off the assets of the second largest broadcaster in Mexico, that, Your Honor, seems unlikely.

THE COURT: Okay. If I understood the testimony yesterday, I think Mr. Guerra even agreed with this point, which is that there isn't any precedent with respect to how the concurso court is going to look at COMI, whether it's going to look at it on an individual debtor-by-debtor basis or it's going to look at it separately.

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MR. QURESHI: Correct.

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THE COURT: So we don't know whether -- what the court is going to do with that. Obviously, an insolvency court, like the concurso court is, will look at what it thinks is appropriate, but it probably doesn't surprise you that when you take a look back at our early cases here in the United States where other countries had passed the model law before us, before we had Chapter 15, that people looked at other countries and what happened in other countries and how they approached it. And obviously, here in the United States and in many of the other countries around the world that have a model law, people have approached it on an entity-by-entity basis. So there's no certainty, I think based on today, that it's going to look at a group approach in COMI. You don't know what they're going to do. know what they're going to do. That's why I asked the question, if there was any question.

MR. QURESHI: No, I think Your Honor, Your Honor is right that there are different possibilities. These are many of the issues, if not most of the issues, that the experts are opining on, are issues of first impression in Mexico. And that's hardly surprising given the relatively recent enactment of the LCM and even more recently, the specialized concurso courts, but also, shall we say, somewhat peculiar facts of this case?

THE COURT: Well, they are unusual. That's true.
All right. Well you mentioned a concern about assets
leaving the United States. I guess I really wanted to
understand what the concern is about that. I think there
obviously has been some discovery and I'm going to be
careful not to say anything that's confidential, of course,
on the record about what's here now, also what contracts
parties were entered into in the past. You obviously have
looked at what things were at various times and you know
that there was a sale of assets, because that's public, of
the, of the, I guess the network that was here in the United
States. And that that occurred to a third party and when
that occurred and that eventually, that shut down as well
the third party shut it down, not TV Azteca, of course,
because it belonged to the third party at that point. What
is the basis for the concern about there being a lot of
assets here in the United States? Again, I don't have all
the data much like you don't have all the data, but the data
that I do have and that you've provided from discovery,
certainly seems like there were a handful of entities that
operated in the United States, the US, the US incorporated
entities, as well as TV Azteca itself had some operations
here because there are some contracts. But it doesn't
appear from the discovery that you received that there was
anything that indicates that prior to that there was any

other real obligations. And some of those contracts go back to when the notes were issued, you know, the years of -- the year that the note was issued. There's certainly information that was provided. Certainly there's a lot of information, financial information about, at least some information about '19 and '20 and 2021 and 2022. Where is the concern coming from assets dissipating from the United States? Because I need to really understand that, why that's a concern, because it just doesn't seem to me like there was that many assets that were in the United States.

MR. QURESHI: Sure. Right. So to be clear, Your Honor, we did get some discovery and what we know Your Honor knows because everything that is conceivably relevant is part of the record before the Court. And, Your Honor, we certainly don't have any specific information that would suggest that assets are being moved. Here is the nature of the concern.

Subsequent to the sale of the broadcasting assets in the United States -- that occurred in, I believe it was 2019 if I have my years right -- so it was 2021 when the debtor decided that they were going to stop paying interest. And at that time, we know that they had plenty of liquidity because they went on to voluntarily redeem 200-plus million dollars of the Mexican debt. And so the basis of our concern is that if the debtors are engaged in a long term

plan to pull back from the US market, so they sold the broadcasting assets, are they in the process of taking other assets out of the country? Are they in the process of, for example, pulling back on some of the operations that we talked about when we talked about contacts with the US jurisdiction? To be clear, Your Honor, we don't know. with the injunctions in place, that is the concern. We don't have access to any information. And again, a cooperative issuer would be providing financial information, at a minimum, to the trustee. And where we have the combination of a debtor that is not cooperating and a debtor that at the same time is obtaining all of these ex parte injunctions that says there has been no acceleration, there are no obligations owing, in those circumstances Your Honor can understand why the noteholders are concerned that what the debtors are doing is taking anything that might be reached that is of value by the noteholders and making it go away.

THE COURT: Okay. I guess another question I had for you, I guess my understanding is, you know, under our obviously state LLC laws, usually an LLC is either member managed or manager managed. And so I, my impression of what you were talking about vis a vis the US entity, and who was signing contracts on their behalf, is a little different than perhaps your impression was of it or the way that you

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were characterizing it. So I just wanted to make sure I wasn't missing something. I mean, when I would see that in an LLC myself, understanding how LLCs operate, I would assume that they had a position. There wasn't -- in an LLC, typically there's not directors unless there's something unusual and that they either have members or managers. my assumption would be that this might be a manager managed LLC. But you seem to be sort of using the title and I guess in a way that sort of implied that maybe the party was an employee. And I'm not sure I would take that, that would be my interpretation of it. Just based on what I understand about LLC law, my interpretation would be that the person has a position at that entity where they have authority to operate as a manager under their operating agreement or their, their LLC agreement, which I obviously haven't seen, but just, I would assume that that's something that was there and not that this meant that they were an employee or acting as an employee of the debtor. So I just want to make sure I wasn't missing something. MR. QURESHI: Sure, certainly, Your Honor. first of all, no, we have no reason to believe that that person may be an employee as opposed to a manager of an LLC. More importantly, Your Honor, that's not the relevant point because our view of establishment is that the formal designation, employee or not, isn't relevant.

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relevant is the economic activity.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. QURESHI: In this case, the economic activity, whether it's undertaken by a manager of an LLC or a manager that is also an employee, it's neither here nor there. So that point is not relevant to what we were arguing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. I understand. And it could be obviously that they're taking, which would make sense because this happens in LLCs, the manager is taking, making decisions on behalf of the entity and acting as any manager would. And if that person is in the United States, that would certainly be some evidence of activity by the party who has, who can make decisions at least legally for purposes of the agreement under it. But obviously, I haven't seen the LLC agreement, so I have no idea.

MR. QURESHI: Right. And, Your Honor, if I may just return to a prior question the Court asked about, the concern with respect to assets. So Your Honor has in the record the Univision contract you have to use as an example, right? That is with the US entity. And we know that there are substantial revenues pursuant to that contract. We don't know where that cash is going. So that -- the exhibits that I put before Your Honor had a schedule that shows the timing of the payments. They're quite regular.

Page 139 1 No idea where that cash is going. Is, is that cash that is 2 for a moment in time sitting in the account of the US debtor here in New York or somewhere else in the United States and 3 4 immediately going to Mexico? We don't know and this is 5 again one of the high priority items that in a Chapter 11, 6 we would use the tools available to us immediately to find 7 out what is going on with cash among other assets. 8 THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's helpful. I 9 actually don't have any other questions. Thank you. 10 MR. QURESHI: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: I'm sure you wanted to respond, Mr. 12 Clareman. 13 MR. CLAREMAN: Yes, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: I know. That's okay, I was expecting 15 it. 16 MR. CLAREMAN: I'll be brief. 17 THE COURT: Before you get started, I just wanted 18 to make sure I said something. I know counsel for Diamond 19 is here. And before counsel for Diamond had asked me if 20 they could make a statement and I told them when everyone's 21 argument was finished, which it isn't yet, Mr. Clareman, 22 that they were going to be allowed to make a statement. But 23 I just didn't want anyone to be surprised when counsel makes 24 a statement. So sorry for that for the record. 25 MR. CLAREMAN: Your Honor, I would like to start

with the bad debtor argument and construct. What I think we have really heard is that in the petitioning creditor's view, a bad debtor is a debtor that doesn't do what they want the debtor to do. There -- I told Your Honor in my initial argument that there have not -- in response to your question -- that there have not been discussions since the petitions were filed. We have said we are willing to mediate. There were discussions before the petitions were filed. They were not successful. There is not a record on which to judge who, as between the parties, is at fault for those talks breaking down. And I'm not going to say anything more about that other than to comment that there's not a record about that. And I think --

question for a different reason because the case law basically says, is there something else imminent? And it requires me to look at whether there's other things going on that are imminent that might resolve the dispute between the parties, including other insolvency proceedings, which we know aren't here, and out-of-court discussions.

MR. CLAREMAN: Right.

THE COURT: And since I did not know without asking you what is going on in an out-of-court discussion, I had to ask the question.

MR. CLAREMAN: I understand and I think the fact

that we are here saying we are willing to mediate and the fact that the petitioning creditors are saying enter an order to relief first is relevant to that question. We heard from Mr. Qureshi about his concerns about what the debtors are doing and do they have the information that they need? We have certainly been making an effort to provide information to produce discovery. We produced two new contracts last week. We've made an effort. We have a sworn statement from the CEO. The CEO was deposed about the US assets. Your Honor asked questions about this, but I don't think there is a basis in the record to be concerned about dissipation of assets. We've heard about the Cebures --

THE COURT: And I also, before you go on any further, I also did read the deposition transcript last night. So I know what was said at the deposition.

MR. CLAREMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. We heard about the Cebures and the fact that the Cebures were paid. That was publicly disclosed when that decision was initially made. The Cebures were due to mature in September of 2022. So they were a first maturing debt. There was nothing in the indentures that prevented the payment of the Cebures. I know that they don't like that the Cebures were repaid, but there are reasons for that. And there was no, there was no there are reasons for that and there was no breach of the indenture associated with that. And it was the first

maturing debt. So it would be natural to address it first.

You know a lot of the argument that we've heard and we've heard it a lot and Your Honor commented on it, was the good debtor/bad debtor construct. A lot of the argument here boils down to bad Mexico. There are numerous courts that have considered Mexican procedure, have addressed it as an adequate alternative forum. They had an expert on Mexican law come and testify. Did not testify that things were being done that were contrary to Mexican law. That opinion was not offered. Our argument, fundamentally, is you need Mexico in order to have a restructuring. And that's the point of the ultimate agreement between the experts under 293 and the agreement that there is clearly an establishment in Mexico.

So the question of what Mexico will do is one that is inevitable, how Mexico treats restructuring, how its law differs from our law. There is no way around it. The -- and I'll just say further on that point, we heard again from Mr. Guerra. I think the new theory that maybe a liquidator could take a Chapter 11 plan and use that. Fundamentally, Mexican law is what it is. There needs to be, it needs to comply with Mexican law and there's no reason to believe that a confirmable plan here would be the same thing as the liquidator might adopt after some hypothetical concurso process and all the other processes associated with Mexican

law. I think that's just speculation at this point.

We also heard complaints about the proceedings before Judge Gardephe and defenses that were asserted. A complaint -- in summary judgment, a complaint was filed. The case was removed from federal court. The arguments that were made were all arguments that are consistent with applicable US law. Judge Gardephe could have ruled on them. Surely he will if the cases are unstayed. And fundamentally, that courtroom, that is the, that's the deal that was signed up for. I understand that there may be difficulties enforcing a judgment, the amount of time it will take if there is a judgment from Judge Gardephe and going back to Mexico. But that is the bargain when you do, when you do business with a Mexican company. That is just part of the process.

And my last comment -- and Ms. Cornish may have some additional points to make in response to some of the issues that she addressed, and of course, if Your Honor asks questions for me, I'd be happy to address them. This is also on the bad debtor point. This is a Mexican company.

It doesn't want to restructure in the United States. That is not an unusual thing. A US company would want -- not want -- many US companies would not want to involuntarily restructure in Mexico. We would think it very strange actually, if NBC or Comcast, or one of these other countries

was being hailed into a Mexican concurso court on an involuntary basis, on the basis of the record that's here in terms of the contacts with that country. If it was the shoe was on the other foot, so to speak, we would think that very unusual. I think that would look very strange.

And the suggestion that even if -- this is in response to Mr. Qureshi's comments about Multicanal and Globopar and the fact that there were some restructuring negotiations there. I've already made comments about, I think, the effect of our willingness to mediate on that. But fundamentally, there is no case that I'm aware of where A US court looked at the law of the foreign jurisdiction and concluded this won't work under the circumstances. It's not enforceable and it's not doable in a manner that is consistent with the foreign jurisdiction's law and said nevertheless, we'll go ahead and exercise jurisdiction and deny a request for extension.

Unless Your Honor has any questions at this time,

I'll turn the podium back to Ms. Cornish.

THE COURT: I have two things. Sorry. One though, you really haven't answered my question about then why not file in Mexico yourself? Why isn't there a concurso there? No disrespect, if you're not going to have a consensual out-of-court restructuring of this debt, which is not insubstantial, and at least in front of Judge Gardephe,

you've agreed you owe 466 -- your client owes \$466 million US or approximately that from the interest payments and the principal payment, forget the redemption payment for a moment, premium for a moment. I mean I've seen the financials. I mean the company has to operate, it has to have cash to operate. It hasn't managed to refinance these notes in three years. It just sounds like it needs a restructuring. And a restructuring can happen in a lot of ways, not just the way you're saying in court. It can happen out of court, but that requires people to talk to each other and for people to actually try to have an out-ofcourt restructuring and understand that it is restructuring time and they have to approach it that way. It also means that they could file in Mexico and seek to use the Mexican laws to restructure. Whether that will be, they ultimately come up with something consensual and that works, who knows? And the Mexican laws are clear that there has to be an agreement that's acceptable to the debtor -- between the debtors and their creditors, so it's both. Or we have our bankruptcy proceeding.

I do not disagree with you, but the first place one would think a Mexican company is going is in Mexico and not here. I agree. But it's one thing to say, you don't think the restructuring should take place in Mexico, should take place in the United States. It's another to say, I'm

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ducking restructuring. That's why I'm having some problems here. And does that -- it is just clear to me that a restructuring has to take place. And yes, your client could certainly take the bull by the horns and file concurso itself. And that would certainly lend credence to why I would have to abstain, for example, under the case law because there would be a pending proceeding. For sure, you know, that would be a different argument. It certainly would mean there's a basis for parties for resolving their problems.

It doesn't require the note holders to have to potentially violate -- be in violation of superior court orders in Mexico. It doesn't require the same insolvency test. It requires a less difficult insolvency test. And if parties actually reached an agreement, they might be able to avoid an insolvency test at all through the prepack nature that people discussed in the concurso law.

So yes, if your clients were desperately trying to restructure, otherwise, I think those arguments are very helpful and appropriate. But what I see here is somebody who's just trying to avoid restructuring. And you're right that maybe that's not my job to be the restructuring police, but I just don't think it's realistic to argue, yeah, this should be, this all should happen in Mexico. Yeah, it's not right for it to happen here, but then not to have it

happening in some way, whether it's through the out-of-court arrangement or through the Mexican process. And the problem that I have here, which is unlike most of the abstention cases, most of the abstention cases that discuss non -foreign non-convenience, is I don't have another form that's pending and I don't have any evidence that there's an outof-court restructuring here. And this is why I have a problem with this. And it's a horrible, Hobson's choice as well. Okay. It's a horrible Hobson's choice that you all -- that is before me. I understand. But I don't think you can tell me that I should on one hand, consider it odd that someone wants to come here and restructure when you don't fit into all the cases for abstention, most of them, because the debtor in this case or in this case, I'll make it clear, the alleged debtors have not taken the bull by the horns and actually availed themselves of either out-of-court restructuring on a current and continuing basis, which if you look at those cases, there's like recent cases, cases where progress is being made. Yourself, you noted that in Multicanal, cases where things are going on, or cases where there's a foreign proceeding. I don't have that. It makes this case very unique. MR. CLAREMAN: All right. I think the best answer that I can give is that -- and maybe Ms. Cornish may have more to say about this particular thing -- but the fact that

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there is a dispute with this group of creditors is, I agree, a good reason to have a conversation and negotiation with that group of creditors. And we are willing to mediate. The decision to file a plenary bankruptcy case and restructure potentially all of the assets and liabilities of the company in accordance with Mexican law, dealing with all the stakeholders, is a complicated decision that goes far beyond a dispute with them no matter the size of the obligation. And so I think there can be very legitimate reasons not to take the step of filing a concurso. That may not be the best thing for the company. It may not be the best thing even for them. I think that this proceeding --THE COURT: No, I agree. I think if the parties actually talked and reached an agreement that might ultimately be the right answer and how you memorialize that agreement is going to be determined by what the agreement is. And I'm assuming in this context that there's actually an agreement, meaning the company, the alleged debtors and the noteholders all agree on how to restructure it. yes, you're right. There could be a lot of other ways of influencing this. And I do not have -- personally think that an involuntary Chapter 11 is the best way here necessarily, but it can't be that there isn't a process here to ask me then to abstain. I mean you are asking me to abstain where there's nothing happening. And I'm not sure

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you can point me to a case where there was nothing happening in those abstention cases. And I think you need to go back and look at them, but I can tell you, I can't find that.

MR. CLAREMAN: I agree that I haven't seen a case where there is nothing happening. I agree with that. But what I would say in response to that is only right now, we are actually agreeing to proceed with the process with them to try to negotiate with them and we are hearing resistance. We're hearing, please, Judge, enter an order --

THE COURT: I understand. I get that. Maybe that's -- if they decide that's the way they're going to go, then they're going to get my ruling, good, bad, indifferent.

MR. CLAREMAN: But I would also say that in terms of the case law and the existence of a parallel proceeding, it is I agree. The cases involve other frequently foreign proceedings or some discussions, you know, overseas with creditor constituencies. But the point that I made earlier, which I do think is relevant and I do think is consistent with the case law, is that there will be a foreign other proceeding inevitably. And that foreign proceeding --

THE COURT: Well maybe not. We just talked about how there might not be a foreign proceeding inevitably. If you all reach an agreement, maybe this will be done as an out-of-court restructuring. That is possible. It does happen if you have the requisite votes for bondholders. I

don't know whether you can get them, but it occasionally happens. It can be done as prepack concurso perhaps. It can even be done as a prepackaged 11 in that case. You might decide that's the best thing depending on where all your noteholders are and where you want to get the injunctions. Who knows? Until you actually have a deal, you don't know the answer about where the best place is for it. But I understand your point that, that, you know, that there are issues about it being here under these circumstances. that, believe me. You know I've had some interesting things since I went on the bench myself in the international environment. One of my first large debtor cases, large cases I got was a gold mine in the Kyrgyz Republic where the, where the, you know, where the country of the Kyrgyz Republic was fighting everything. So not only did I have the issues that you're raising about abstention and whether I should have jurisdiction over it, but I also have the added things of issues about foreign sovereign immunity, which made things really exciting for me. MR. CLAREMAN: I was actually involved in that case with Alan Kornberg and Paul Weiss. We were representing the parent company. THE COURT: Yeah, it's been -- you know all about it then. MR. CLAREMAN: Yeah.

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THE COURT: And I mean, I think that's an example of sometimes where things end up in front of our court that don't make a lot of sense and ultimately, they lead to people resolving things in ways that made sense. And maybe you all need to resolve things. And I'm not saying my proceeding is absolutely the right way to do this or that an involuntary is the right way to do this, especially under these facts. These are very unusual facts, believe me, I understand that. But people not making any effort to resolve it and then there not being another proceeding or process going on, and then you ask the Court to abstain, that makes that a little harder.

MR. CLAREMAN: And my, my last point on this will be in terms of people not making any effort. I don't think that it is -- the record is susceptible to evaluating whose fault that is, who is making --

THE COURT: I'm not, I'm not making fault. I'm

just pointing out that it hasn't been happening. Again, I

asked because every case that I looked at on this issue,

every case my law clerks found on this issue -- and believe

me, we do our own research -- and we, you know, and you

know, from the first time you started this, even long before

we saw your briefs, we started looking at some of these

issues because we knew where this was going. I knew where

this is going. I've been in this field too long to not know

where it was going. But I, you know, every case that pretty much exists out there where courts have abstained under these circumstances, it's because something else was happening and that's where I have a problem here. I don't have a something else, which is why I'm suggesting that parties really try to have a something else. That parties don't want to try to have a something else now, then that's fine. I'll get to my ruling. That's the answer because that's where we have to go next. But I will say this is not, you know, it's not a, it's, it's not, well, I really acknowledge how horrible it would be perhaps for me to be allowing this case to go forward, just go with the "your client doesn't cooperate" argument and my having to issue a billion orders that will probably be ignored in Mexico. I'm not going to enjoy that if that's where we're going. Believe me, I understand.

But, you know, the abstention cases abstain for reasons and those abstention cases are usually cases where something else is happening. And I'm just not sure I'm seeing that here and that's my problem. And I just don't find it fits in the case law. And again, it's not because I would love to have a case like that. I would not, just flat out, I would not enjoy that. You know I've certainly had situations where I issued orders that other courts have ignored, particularly in that case that I mentioned. And

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that's not fun for me either. But I, I have to look at the case law and I have to say, well, this case is just completely different than every other abstention case that's come before any other court, including respectively, respectfully, the arguments that were made to the district court, the arguments that were made to the other bankruptcy courts before me. This is not, there's just not facts like this.

And so, you know, when you're arguing to me that I should abstain and some of this is in your control, I have to think about that too.

MR. CLAREMAN: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CORNISH: Your Honor, I know we've been here a long time. Just a couple things.

THE COURT: Nah, this is not bad at all. Come on.

MS. CORNISH: Your Honor, first off, I don't, I don't want to rehash your discussion with Mr. Clareman, but I do want to point out that the something else has been and continues to be, and it may not be sufficient in your eyes, and the something else has clearly been the pendency of an action that was filed by the noteholders at their -- excuse me, at their direction by the indenture trustee represented by Akin Gump. You know it has been fully briefed and is pending before Judge Gardephe. That's the something else.

As to why the company has not filed a full blown plenary concurso proceeding in Mexico, Your Honor, Mr. Clareman made this point, but this is one indenture, one set of notes.

Companies in the United States don't file, large companies with global operations and lots of creditors and government regulators and everything, don't just go file plenary proceedings without any kind of a deal --

THE COURT: Agreed.

MS. CORNISH: -- in order to -- and so I get the notion why didn't you file a voluntary case? There was a lawsuit, there is a lawsuit pending with respect to these I understand that if there ultimately were a deal that we had to deal with holdouts, that's the prepack. all know that. That's how it works, right? It works, it works that way here. I'm presuming the prepack in Mexico works the same way. You use that pre pack and that plenary proceeding, which we all know, doesn't affect anybody else. It's done to deal with holdouts. We're not at that place. So it would make no sense for a company like TV Azteca, nor would it make any sense to Billy's point for NBC to file a full blown Chapter 11 case in order to deal with a dispute over one series of notes that has not yet been packaged up into a prepack. So from a business perspective, I'm not answering the question. Okay. But from a legal perspective and from a practical perspective, that's why. Okay?

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Page 155 1 THE COURT: Okay. But then also it's been three 2 years, two years, whatever it is. 3 MS. CORNISH: Understood. And unfortunately, I 4 haven't been around for those three years. 5 THE COURT: I hear that. 6 MS. CORNISH: But I'm telling you that, you know -7 THE COURT: But it's three years of interest 8 9 payments. You acknowledged, at least in front of Judge 10 Gardephe, and I say it that way because it's clear to me 11 there are some other arguments in the Mexican part, that the 12 entire principle is also due and owing. 13 Okay, there's a dispute over -- I don't mean to 14 diminish it or to say it's not important because I 15 understand it is a dispute and it is going to have to be 16 resolved somewhat -- \$17 million. Okay. Clearly, there's 17 still an issue with paying the 400 whatever it is, 60million dollars, 65-million dollars in US debt. 18 19 MS. CORNISH: Understood. 20 THE COURT: And that's not a small amount even for 21 a large company like --22 MS. CORNISH: Understood, Judge. Even so, that's 23 not a reason like right now to just file a voluntary 24 bankruptcy. 25 THE COURT: But it's a reason why negotiations

should have been going on because --

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MS. CORNISH: And as Mr. Clareman has said, Your Honor has put out the notion of mediation. And we will, we will do that. We've said that. We will -- we are not agreeing with the approach that Your Honor rules and enters an order for relief to give them all the leverage --

THE COURT: I understand. I don't think that was -- that was not my proposal.

MS. CORNISH: Understood. And I just want to make that very, very clear. But yes, yes, we will enter into those discussions. It should not be a surprise, the bad debtor stuff while using the first 25 times, really is offensive. It's, it's offensive. This, these companies have done nothing and there is not an ounce of evidence in this record that these companies have breached any duties, that these companies have done anything illegal or improper. In fact, we've been participating promptly in the New York litigation. In Mexico, the petitioning creditor's own expert testified that everything that was going on there was pursuant to Mexican law, which we are not experts in. the issue of secrecy, there is no secrecy. It's called the Hague Convention. Okay? And whether we should have picked up the phone or not, that's a different issue. But the point being --

Pg 157 of 169 Page 157 1 pick up the phone to opposing counsel. 2 MS. CORNISH: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: What bothered me is that you didn't 4 tell Judge Gardephe. MS. CORNISH: Understood, Your Honor, understood. 5 6 THE COURT: That's a different situation. 7 MS. CORNISH: Understood. THE COURT: You've asked him to decide something 8 9 where there's a contrary process going on in a court outside 10 of the country when your own indenture says really clearly 11 that it's supposed to be going on in front of him. And I 12 don't know what he'd want to do with that, but he doesn't 13 know about it. 14 MS. CORNISH: Understood. Understood, Your Honor. 15 And I think that was around the issue of service and 16 everything else. But I, again, I don't, I don't need to 17 belabor it. And we hear Your Honor's concern loud and 18 clear. Please believe that. 19 I guess the last point I'd make before I move to 20 my very narrow point on standing is it should come, it 21 should come as no surprise, and it should not brand a 22 company, okay, a large multinational Mexican company as a 23 bad debtor to say that when that company, which is a Mexican company period, end of story, but has three vestigial -- is 24

that the right word? -- vestigial US entities that are

contract parties and a handful of contracts and some manager, okay, is, is being dragged into an involuntary plenary, highly-publicized Chapter 11 proceeding in the United States. It should come as no surprise to hear that perhaps -- and we have not discussed it with our clients -- but perhaps our clients would not be inclined to happily come along and people are using the word "cooperate." I don't know what cooperate means. If it means we're going to agree to the treatment that the petitioning creditors have laid out in their, in their papers, no, we're not. We're not. And that should not come as a surprise and it should not brand this company as a bad debtor

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CORNISH: So let me move on, Your Honor, onto the narrow issue of standing. Mr. Qureshi argues that our standing, our standing argument fails because the petitioning creditors are not the same parties as the indenture trustee. That it's the trustee, not the petitioning creditors, it's the trustee that's seeking payment of the redemption premium. In the words of Judge Drain, their concession is no concession at all. It was the petitioning creditors along with the rest of the noteholders required to get the requisite number to direct the -- first of all, to file the first notice of default, notice of acceleration that demanded the premium. They were, they

were signatories essentially to that. And then secondly, directing the indenture trustee, who's no more than an agent or a representative for the noteholders, including the petitioning creditors. They filed, they sent the notice of acceleration. They actually -- the indenture trustee didn't get it right the first time. They directed him to file an amended notice on their behalf to seek the premium and then they filed the lawsuit. And we didn't see the petitioning creditors in that lawsuit who now are represented by Akin Gump. And the indenture trustee is represented by Akin Gump, right? Same lawyers.

saying, oh, no, no, no, Judge, we don't want the redemption premium, but everyone else does. No, it is only when it comes time to, in our view, seek to maximize pressure on TV Azteca in connection with the dispute over the notes. It's only then that the petitioning creditors are saying that they're not going to seek to collect that, that premium. Your Honor, as I've said, and as Mr. Clareman noted, the petitioning creditors are noteholders. Under the indenture, there's going to be a process if this case proceeds where Your Honor is going to have to -- and you said this as well -- Your Honor is going to have to determine the amount of the claim under the indenture and the notes. And the petitioning creditors are noteholders and whatever Your

Honor decides, whether they get the premium or not, is going to bind them. There is a current, live dispute including with these petitioning creditors over that issue. And we believe that alone, Your Honor, is cause to dismiss these cases for lack of standing. Thanks.

THE COURT: All right. I think I'm going to, if it's all right, I'm going to allow counsel for Diamond to make their statement that they wanted to on the record. Is that acceptable?

MS. BOY SKIPSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. For the record, Katherine Anne Boy Skipsey from Sheppard Mullin on behalf of Diamond Films. Reserving all rights on this particular motion, Diamond takes no position. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Great. Mr.

Qureshi, I'm taking your statement as saying you do not want

me to order you all to mediation now and you would like me

to go ahead and rule. Is that what you're telling me? I

just want to have it clear for the record.

MR. QURESHI: So, Your Honor, we certainly would need to talk to our clients to see if there would be a willingness to mediate now before a ruling. But let me articulate in perhaps a little more detail the concern. In the absence of an order for relief, number one, we don't think they're going to be a good faith participant. Number two, we are concerned about a continued free pass on paying

interest. If we're stuck in a process for who knows how long, where we are mediating, they're not really participating in good faith. They're just extending essentially a free option, that's part of the concern.

THE COURT: Okay. What's going to happen if I do one of two things that's different than that? Number one, I agree with Ms. -- hypothetical, if I agree with Ms.

Cornish's argument that until you have a judgment from Judge Gardephe where the disputes resolve, there's nothing for me to do here and I dismiss it, you're going back to Judge Gardephe. You're not getting paid interest. You're still litigating in Mexico. That doesn't get you what you're talking about. If I go ahead and deny the motion to dismiss and we get into a Chapter 11, you're talking about unsecured notes. You're not going to get paid interest either. Why is that any different? What is the issue about the economics about the delay?

MR. QURESHI: So, so Your Honor, I think the circumstances under which absent entering in order for relief, mediation, I think would be something that our clients would likely agree to now would be first if there's a time limit on it so that it is not a process that drags out for an indefinite period of time. Second, Your Honor, that it be a process where we actually get financial information.

THE COURT: I agree with you. You have to get some information because I don't know how you can negotiate a restructuring without information. I'm just being realistic. That can't make any sense.

MR. QURESHI: Right.

THE COURT: Otherwise people could just stare at each other.

MR. QURESHI: Correct. And, Your Honor, the third condition, I shouldn't call it a condition. The third suggestion is also that Mr. Salinas be required to participate in the mediation. As the majority equity owner of the company, it is certainly the view of the noteholders that nothing is going to get done without his participation in the mediation. And I would imagine, Your Honor, that with, with those parameters around the mediation, if we could have a short break, we likely would be able to get our client's agreement to mediate.

agree to participate in this. And no disrespect, Paul Weiss doesn't represent Mr. Salinas. So they can't bind Mr. Salinas. Mr. Salinas is not before this Court. There's nothing I can do to order him to do that. I have the alleged debtors before this Court because you filed the petition. I certainly have the ability to order the parties to mediation while they're still before me even under these

circumstances. I don't have the authority to order Mr. Salinas to mediation. Obviously, if Mr. Salinas wants to participate, he could, but I cannot promise you that I'm going to be able to order Mr. Salinas. And even if I had, even if I had denied the motion to dismiss, my jurisdiction is still over the debtor, it's not over Mr. Salinas. So I don't know how I could require Mr. Salinas to participate in this. I understand that if there's any negotiations that are going to happen about changing the equity structure of the company, I'll just put it that way, that for certain Mr. Salinas is going to have to be consulted about that because under Mexican law, there's shareholder approvals that are required. And yes, I do know that because we had to do it in Grupo Aeromexico. So I'm only too familiar with what the rules are. So I understand that he would have to be involved

at that point. So I get that he's going to be one of those parties that necessarily won't have to be in the room. And I don't know if that will make things happen, but I can't compel him at this point. Even if I have denied the motion to dismiss, I still don't have an ability to force him to come to the United States and participate in a mediation.

MR. QURESHI: Understood, Your Honor. Your Honor, may I ask the Court for a short break so we can talk to our clients?

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Page 164 1 THE COURT: Yes. How long would you like? 2 MR. QURESHI: 15 minutes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sure. 3 MR. QURESHI: Thank you. 5 (Off the record) 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. QURESHI: Your Honor, again for the record, 8 Abid Qureshi on behalf of the petitioning creditors. We had 9 the opportunity to speak with our clients and also to Paul 10 Weiss on behalf of the alleged debtors. Your Honor, we 11 agree to mediate. We would suggest the following and these 12 are all things we've discussed with the debtors and I think 13 we're in general agreement on. 14 First, we think the right period of time for 15 mediation would be 60 days. Secondly, we would like access 16 to financial information. I think that's a subject that's 17 going to need to be discussed further, perhaps also with the assistance of the mediator to make a determination as to as 18 19 to what financial information we will receive. But that 20 clearly is something that will be necessary. Third, we 21 would like the mediation to be in person and with decision 22 makers in the room. And again, we've already had a 23 discussion about who for the debtors that most likely 24 decision makers are to be. And fourth, Your Honor, we would

like a former judge as a mediator. We have begun discussing

potential mediators and I think, Your Honor, we need a little more time to do that. And then we'll come back to the Court if that's ok with the suggestion.

THE COURT: Yes. No, that's fine. Of course. I would have suggested that anyway, that you have a former judge handle it because this strikes me as a case where that's kind of necessary given what the issues are. And I would have, I would have suggested 60 days. So that was fine. And meanwhile, that would mean I would keep working on my decision. Trust me, I won't stop doing that.

MR. QURESHI: And the last point, Your Honor, and I think this is an obvious one, but for purposes of Your Honor considering the issue to the extent a ruling is required, the mediation will not be a factor taken into account in the ruling itself.

THE COURT: Okay. No, that makes sense to me. I think that's only fair for both sides. I mean, I'm asking you to do it in essence, both of you. So I don't think -- that seems fair.

MR. QURESHI: Okay, thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I guess you all need a little more time to talk about it. Should we, do you want to set a time or a date for a status conference so you can tell me where things are going with it. It seems like that might be a good idea.

MR. CLAREMAN: Yes, we agree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So when would you like to do that? I guess that's a question for you. I know we have a holiday coming up. End of next week? Okay. Yeah, end of next week is fine. I would have to do it I think Friday, if it's going to be the very end Friday afternoon, maybe any time really after 10. They actually have to look and see if I have something else after 10. But it is fine. I have a, I'm speaking at a conference in Chicago next Thursday and Friday. I'm actually speaking on Friday at 8 a.m. at the ABA conference. But after that, I don't mind going to my hotel room and having a conference. That's fine. So if you bear with me a second, I might have to go get my other phone. One of the things about being a judge is that I have three phones and, you know, two phones and three calendars, including my hearing calendar. So it keeps things a little lively. Oh, yeah, we have training at 10 a.m. She's reminding me that's the answer. So, no, you answered my question because I thought there was something I had agreed to at 10 a.m. which is probably right. How would it be -would it be okay -- sorry. We have mandatory training for our court at 10 a.m. which is what --MR. QURESHI: Your Honor, we can certainly do Thursday as well if that's easier. I don't know if you got

something.

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THE COURT: It's ok for me too. So any time on
Thursday in the afternoon is fine because I'm traveling to
Chicago in the morning. So anytime in the afternoon is
fine.

MR. QURESHI: Okay. 4:00 Thursday?

THE COURT: 4:00 is fine. Would that work for you

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MR. CLAREMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay, fine. So we'll set up a schedule for that, a Zoom, on our end for status conference. Okay. All right. And then I just wanted to thank everybody. I know obviously it's been a busy two days and also a tremendous amount of work and preparation. So I greatly appreciate that. And also I will just say it's really nice for my law clerks to get the opportunity to see fine counsel all around. Trust me, that doesn't happen all that often. Not nearly as much as you would think even in our district. So it's actually really always a good opportunity for them. And I told my intern that now he's spoiled because he's seen really fine lawyers. And so the next time we have a hearing, which is Thursday, he's going to be disappointed he's not seeing the same things exactly as we saw here the last few days. And that, as I said to him, it's just going to go downhill from here. That was my joke to him. So, anyway, thank you all for your hard work

Page 168 and your fine arguments. I appreciate it and preparation. All right. Is there anything else we need to discuss then before we adjourn for the day? MR. QURESHI: Nothing, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. With that, Court is adjourned. I appreciate everyone's hard efforts and have a nice rest of the day. (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 6:14 PM)

Page 169 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing 4 transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. 5 Sonya M. deslarshi Hydl 6 7 8 Sonya Ledanski Hyde 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Veritext Legal Solutions 21 330 Old Country Road 22 Suite 300 Mineola, NY 11501 23 24 25 Date: September 1, 2023